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Ground combat vehicles (GCV) traditionally rely on passive armor to reduce their 
vulnerability against threats. This is insufficient now, given the increasing gap between 
threat lethality and passive armor capability and the change in threat scenario from 
relatively open terrain to urban terrain. 
This thesis provides an overview of system survivability and discusses the 
conventional approach to GCV survivability. This thesis then uses a systems engineering 
approach to guide the subsequent study, which identifies likely threats to GCVs in an 
urban environment and discusses potential susceptibility reduction techniques and 
technologies that can counter the threats. 
This thesis then develops a survivability assessment model (using Imagine That’s 
ExtendSim), which quantifies the different survivability characteristics of a GCV and 
determines the sets of survivability characteristics to meet the defined survivability 
requirement. Finally, this thesis demonstrates the use of a decision-making methodology 
(multi-attribute decision-making) to manage the capability conflicts that arise between 
survivability and other key platform capabilities. Therefore, this author hopes to help 
military planners and engineers design more robust, holistic and balanced survivability 
solutions for GCVs, to provide more flexibility against different types of threats and 
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Military planners expect ground combat vehicles (GCV) to fight primarily in 
head-on engagements over relatively open terrain. As such, engineers optimize the 
survivability systems for GCVs to provide the highest level of protection over the frontal 
arc of the vehicle. The conventional approach to GCV survivability focuses primarily on 
vulnerability reduction, which seeks to minimize the probability that enemy engagement 
kills a ground vehicle. Engineers primarily achieve vulnerability reduction on GCVs by 
using passive armor. While this survivability concept is suitable for traditional head-on 
engagements over relatively open terrain, it is insufficient to protect ground vehicles for 
urban combat, especially with the involvement of asymmetric elements. Urban combat is 
radically different from head-on engagements as threats can come from any direction in 
an urban environment, often with little or no warning. Therefore, optimizing protection in 
the frontal arc of a GCV only protects a small percentage of the vehicle against threats in 
an urban environment. Technologically and numerically superior armies suffered from 
unexpectedly high casualties and losses in recent urban conflicts such as Chechnya, Iraq, 
Afghanistan and Palestine, which bear testament to the insufficiency of the existing 
survivability concept for GCVs. The increasing gap between threat lethality and the 
proliferation of advanced anti-armor weaponry exacerbates this insufficiency.  
The twin concepts of susceptibility and vulnerability define survivability in the 
survivability discipline. In order to protect GCVs sufficiently in urban operations, this 
author believes that military planners and engineers need to consider and incorporate 
susceptibility reduction, which seeks to prevent a hostile threat from hitting the system, 
upfront into the vehicle design. Engineers have utilized susceptibility reduction 
extensively for aircraft and ships over the years, and there are well-established 
susceptibility reduction techniques (threat warning and situational awareness, signature 
management, threat suppression, tactics and performance, noise jamming and deception 
and expendables) and technologies that are applicable to ground combat vehicles. This 
thesis discusses these susceptibility reduction techniques and technologies in detail and 
their applicability to GCVs. 
 xx 
This author also proposes a survivability assessment model (using ExtendSim) 
that one can use to determine the set of survivability characteristics that a GCV should 
have to meet defined threat scenarios and survivability requirements. The threat scenario 
is a single missile attack against a GCV in an urban environment from a distance of 100 
m, and the probability that the missile attack kills a ground combat vehicle cannot exceed 
5% (i.e., the probability of survival shall be at least 95%), at 95% confidence level. 
Unlike existing survivability models, the proposed model incorporates both vulnerability 
reduction and susceptibility reduction, particularly with the addition of hard-kill active 
protection system (APS) capability. Hard-kill APS is a key upcoming susceptibility 
reduction technology, and it uses physical countermeasures to intercept and destroy 
incoming threats before they hit the protected vehicle. The proposed model considers 
seven survivability characteristics or factors, namely P(active), P(detect), P(engage), 
P(hit), P(killed), APSP(hit) and APS minimum defeat distance (MDD). This author uses 
the nearly orthogonal Latin hypercube (NOLH) technique to generate 33 different design 
points for the factors and uses the ExtendSim simulation to determine which design 
points meet the defined survivability requirements. Based on the simulation results, this 
author uses linear regression analysis to identify the significant factors, to rank the 
significant factors in terms of their level of influence on the overall probability of 
survival and to develop a best-fit linear model that predicts the overall probability of 
survival. This author found that all the factors are significant, with MDD having the 
highest influence on the overall probability of survivability for the defined threat 
scenario. Leveraging the prior discussion on susceptibility reduction techniques and 
technologies, this author proposed different survivability architectures to meet the 
survivability characteristics, with each architecture resulting in varying trade-offs with 
other GCV capabilities (e.g., combat weight, passenger payload, ammunition capacity, 
mean time between failure). Finally, this author demonstrates the usage of a well-
established systems engineering methodology known as multi-attribute decision-making 
(MADM) to manage the capability trade-offs and to facilitate decision on the most cost-
effective survivability architecture to adopt for the defined threat scenario and 
survivability requirement. This author hopes that the improved model and decision-
 xxi 
making methodology presented in this thesis helps military planners and engineers design 
more robust, holistic and balanced survivability solutions for GCVs in the future, to 
provide greater flexibility against different types of threats and threat scenarios. 
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Increasingly, strategists expect ground combat vehicles (GCV) to fight in 
urbanized terrain. Urban terrain offers significant advantages to a defender, especially if 
the defender is technologically inferior to the attacker. The close confines of urban terrain 
negate long-range firepower, degrade sensor capability and reduce the overall 
effectiveness of technologically advanced weapons systems. Urban terrain also offers 
many avenues of ambush and attack, which bogs down an attacker and results in high 
levels of attrition. 
Ground combat vehicles, especially main battle tanks (MBT) and infantry fighting 
vehicles (IFV), are the mainstay of technologically superior armies. The combination of 
firepower, mobility and survivability allows such vehicles to dominate ground military 
operations. Military planners expect GCVs to fight in relatively open terrain, where 
threats come from the front. Therefore, engineers optimize the survivability for most 
GCVs to defend against frontal attacks. Figure 1 illustrates the differences between 
operating in open and urban terrains. The close confines of an urban environment, 
coupled with multiple avenues of ambush and attack, allow enemies to attack a GCV 
from any direction, which significantly complicates the survivability equation for the 
vehicle. 
 
Figure 1.  How Threat Direction Has Changed as Combat Evolved. Source: 
Kempinski and Murphy (2012). 
 2 
The recent conflicts in the Middle East amply demonstrate the increased 
complication of GCV survivability due to urban operations. During the conflicts in Iraq 
and Afghanistan in the 2000s, U.S. ground forces found themselves in a similar position 
to the U.S. military aircraft community during the Vietnam conflict in Southeast Asia. 
The warfighters operated in a threat environment using vehicles not specifically designed 
to survive in that particular environment, resulting in high levels of vehicle kills and 
occupant casualties.  
The U.S. forces primarily used GCVs such as the M1 Abrams MBT and the M2 
Bradley IFV in the Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts. Military planners and engineers 
designed these vehicles back in the 1970s and 1980s (the Cold War period with the 
former Soviet Union) to function as integral components of a combined-arms force. 
Consequently, military planners and engineers designed these vehicles to fight a 
conventional, or symmetric, war between near peers, with a relatively well-defined 
battlefront and with sufficient knowledge of the location of enemy assets. This traditional 
concept of operations for GCVs and the associated survivability design of the vehicles 
proved to be correct when the United States launched Operation Desert Storm (ODS) 
against Iraq in 1991. The U.S. GCVs dominated the Iraqi forces in various engagements, 
leading to a swift conclusion of the land campaign in a mere 100 hours. As the United 
States did not intend to occupy Iraq, the troops and equipment departed for home quickly 
after the swift conclusion of the land campaign.  
During the military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan in the 2000s, the U.S. 
forces used similar equipment with both the Iraqi and Afghan regimes being quickly 
defeated as well. The main difference between these operations and ODS was that unlike 
ODS, the U.S. forces did not depart from the theater of operations after defeating the 
regimes. Instead, the U.S. forces stayed behind and functioned as a stabilization force to 
facilitate the reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan. Consequently, the U.S. forces 
utilized the same GCVs to conduct operations against an asymmetric enemy that 
leveraged the constraints of an urban environment to make up for their technological and 
numerical inferiority. This new form of asymmetric urban operations is a radical 
departure from the original design requirements of the GCVs, which required GCVs to 
 3 
fight and survive conventional operations in relatively open terrain and against a near 
peer adversary. Unlike conventional engagements over relatively open terrain and with 
threats coming primarily from the front, the U.S. GCVs in Iraq and Afghanistan found 
themselves attacked from all directions, usually with little or no warning. The closed 
confines of the urban terrain also made maneuvering difficult and allowed enemies to 
channel the GCVs into designated killing zones. Engineers also designed the GCVs to 
protect occupants against ballistic projectiles primarily, with little emphasis on 
underbody threats such as mines and IEDs. The enemy exploited this by using mines and 
IEDs extensively against the GCVs. Since the ground combat vehicles operated in an 
environment that was different from the design requirements, it was not surprisingly that 
the U.S. forces suffered high levels of vehicle and personnel loss.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis was guided by the following research questions: 
1. How does one define system survivability? 
2. How is system survivability implemented on ground combat vehicles 
traditionally? 
3. How do urban operations affect the design of a ground combat vehicle? 
4. What are the survivability techniques and technologies that one can use to 
enhance system survivability in urban operations? 
5. How can one quantify the survivability characteristics of a GCV? 
 4 
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II. WHAT IS SYSTEM SURVIVABILITY? 
This chapter seeks to provide a basic overview on what constitutes system 
survivability and discusses the factors that affect system survivability. In the survivability 
discipline, “survivability is defined as the ability of a system to avoid and/or withstand a 
man-made hostile environment” (Ball 2003, 1). Thus, one determines survivability by 
analyzing two high-level factors, namely susceptibility and vulnerability. According to 
Ball, a susceptible system is one that is unable to avoid a hostile damage mechanism, 
while a vulnerable system is one that is unable to withstand a hostile damage mechanism 
(2003). Therefore, in order to improve system survivability, one can use different 
techniques to reduce the susceptibility (inability to avoid attack) and the vulnerability 
(inability to withstand the damage due to an attack) of the system.  
A. SUSCEPTIBILITY 
Ball explains that susceptibility is the inability of a ground vehicle to avoid an 
enemy’s search, detection, and tracking elements, as well as the damage mechanisms 
associated with the enemy’s weapon (2003). Therefore, the higher the probability that an 
enemy weapon detects, engages or hits a ground combat vehicle operating in a hostile 
man-made environment, the more susceptible is the vehicle. According to Ball, four main 
factors influence the susceptibility of a ground vehicle operating in a hostile man-made 
environment: 
1. The quantity, quality and positioning of the enemy weapons (e.g., a large 
quantity of high performance anti-armor weapons and a large number of 
countermeasure-resistant IEDs that enemies deploy on roads that friendly 
forces use increase a ground vehicle’s susceptibility). 
2. The design choices that engineers incorporate into a ground combat 
vehicle (e.g., the use of quieter sub-systems such as electric engines and 
rubber tracks, active management of the vehicle’s signature to reduce the 
probability that a hostile weapon detects, engages or hits the ground 
vehicle and improving maneuverability over cross-country terrain to avoid 
enemy forces reduce susceptibility). 
3. The weapons and survivability equipment the ground vehicle carries to 
mitigate the effects of a hostile man-made environment (e.g., using long-
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range weapon systems such as missiles to kill or suppress hostile forces 
from afar, using a hard-kill active protection system (APS) to defeat 
incoming threats and using an on-board countermeasure device that 
detonates an IED’s warhead before the vehicle comes within the range of 
the IED’s fragment spray and blast zone reduce a vehicle’s susceptibility). 
4. The tactics that the ground vehicle employs (e.g., leveraging terrain 
features and silent watch to minimize the probability that a hostile weapon 
detects the ground vehicle, using C4ISR and situational awareness to 
avoid contact with the enemy forces, using large massed forces when 
attacking to overwhelm the enemy defenses and using convoy escorts to 
suppress any enemy waiting in ambush reduce susceptibility). (2003) 
Susceptibility reflects the inability of a ground vehicle to avoid a man-made 
hostile environment and therefore, susceptibility reduction has the potential to improve 
the ability of a ground vehicle to survive in a man-made hostile environment (i.e., 
susceptibility is a capability gap that should be reduced). Ball proposes six susceptibility 
reduction techniques: 
(1) Threat Warning and Situational Awareness 
Threat warning and situational awareness systems provide early warning 
to the ground vehicle when a hostile weapon system targets the ground 
vehicle. Threat warning and situational awareness systems provide 
information such as threat direction and threat type. Early warning allows 
the ground vehicle to take immediate actions to disrupt the hostile 
targeting actions and ideally to prevent the deployment of the hostile 
weapon system. Examples include radar warning receivers (RWR) on 
aircraft, as well as laser warning devices (LWD) on ground vehicles. 
Having integrated situational awareness systems, such as battlefield 
management systems, also allows friendly forces to have real-time 
knowledge on the location of potential hostile forces and to take early 
action against those hostile forces. 
(2) Signature Reduction  
All systems emit certain signatures such as thermal, radar, acoustic and 
vibration that are detectable by appropriate sensors. Consequently, hostile 
weapon systems exploit these signatures to generate targeting and 
guidance solutions. Therefore, engineers use signature reduction to 
manage and reduce the signatures that a system emits, to minimize the 
probability of a threat detecting and engaging the system. A classic 
example is low-observable aircraft such as the F-117 Nighthawk and the 
F-22 Raptor, which placed significant emphasis on signature reduction, 
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particularly radar and thermal signatures, to maximize overall system 
survivability.  
(3) Expendables  
Operators can deploy expendables, which are non-reusable systems, to 
disrupt the targeting and guidance processes of a hostile weapon system, 
to minimize the probability of hit. Examples include using smoke and 
obscurants as well as flares and chaff to disrupt the guidance mechanisms 
for missiles. 
(4) Threat Suppression  
Military planners can use threat suppression to destroy or suppress hostile 
weapon systems, which prevents their employment against friendly forces. 
Good intelligence and situational awareness are key enablers for effective 
threat suppression. For example, long-range precision fire suppresses or 
destroys enemy air defenses before friendly aircraft enters the area of 
operations. Another example is using sensors and small arms fire to detect 
and suppress an enemy gunner firing a visually guided anti-tank missile. 
As the gunner needs to keep the targeting sight on the target in order to 
guide the missile to the target, suppressing or killing the gunner likely 
results in the missile missing the target. 
(5) Tactics and Performance 
Operators can use appropriate tactics to minimize the probability that a 
hostile weapon system detects and engages a friendly system. An example 
is low-level flying by helicopters. According to the dictionary of U.S. 
Army terms (1983, 109–110), low-level flying refers to “The operation of 
Army aircraft at optimum altitudes which afford cover and concealment 
from ground visual and electronic detection in order to exploit surprise to 
the fullest.” Besides tactics, system performance is also important. For 
example, engineers usually design a ground combat vehicle to have good 
mobility performance, which allows the vehicle to exploit cross-country 
terrain effectively to bypass enemy forces and thus, proceed unimpeded to 
the final objective. 
(6) Noise Jamming and Deception 
This involves the use of electronic countermeasures (ECM) such as 
jammers and decoys. Noise jamming attempts to overload the hostile 
weapon system with multiple targets to confuse the system and to mask 
the actual target amid the jamming noise. Deceiving generates false targets 
that attempt to “seduce” a hostile weapon system away from the actual 
target. Noise jamming and deceiving only work against guided weapons 
and are not effective against unguided weapons (projectiles). Thus, if the 
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threats are primarily unguided weapons, the expendables technique is 
more effective. (2003) 
 
B. VULNERABILITY 
Ball explains that vulnerability is the inability of a ground vehicle to withstand a 
man-made hostile environment (2003). Therefore, the higher the probability that a hostile 
weapon kills a friendly ground combat vehicle operating in a man-made hostile 
environment, the more vulnerable is the ground vehicle. According to Ball, three factors 
influence the vulnerability of a ground vehicle operating in a hostile man-made 
environment: 
1. The characteristics of the enemy warhead damage mechanisms that hit the 
ground vehicle (e.g., increasing the velocity and mass of a kinetic energy 
projectile, increasing the number of projectiles that hit a ground vehicle by 
using a fragmentation warhead and using a larger explosive payload in a 
shaped charge warhead increase the vehicle’s vulnerability). 
2. The design choices that engineers incorporate into a ground combat 
vehicle (e.g., ensuring proper separation of highly flammable materials 
such as fuel and ammunition, protecting the engine compartment using 
armored steel, using mine-resistant seats to reduce the amount of force 
transmitted to the occupants when a mine or IED is detonated and using 
nonflammable hydraulic fluid reduce vulnerability). 
3. The survivability and on-board repair equipment that mitigates the damage 
when a hostile weapon hits the ground vehicle (e.g., installing an 
automatic fire extinguishing system and providing equipment that allows 
operators to perform rapid and minor repairs on critical components 
reduce vulnerability). (2003) 
Vulnerability reflects the inability of a ground vehicle to withstand a man-made 
hostile environment and therefore, vulnerability reduction has the potential to improve 
the ability of a ground combat vehicle to survive in a man-made hostile environment (i.e., 
vulnerability is a capability gap that should be reduced). A system is vulnerable primarily 
because its components are vulnerable (known as critical components) and thus, 
vulnerability reduction seeks to improve system survivability by reducing the probability 
that a hostile damage mechanism kills any of the critical components. Ball proposes six 
vulnerability reduction techniques: 
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(1) Component Redundancy (with Effective Separation) 
Having redundant critical components reduces the probability of system 
kill if a hostile damage mechanism hits and kills one of the critical 
components. For example, engineers implemented two separate engines on 
the A-10 Warthog. Redundant components must have effective separation 
(either have physical separation or have armor in between), to minimize 
the probability that a hostile damage mechanism is able to kill all the 
redundant components at the same time. Component redundancy without 
effective separation enhances overall system reliability only, but not 
survivability. 
(2) Component Location  
In component location, engineers determine the optimal positioning of 
critical components to reduce the probability of a hostile damage 
mechanism hitting and killing a critical component. For example, 
engineers usually place engines at the rear of a ground vehicle in order to 
avoid threats, since most threats come from the frontal arc of the vehicle 
for conventional engagements. 
(3) Active Damage Suppression  
In active damage suppression, engineers use sensors to detect the impact 
of a damage mechanism, and the sensors automatically deploy 
countermeasures to minimize the effects of any damage. An example is 
the automatic fire extinguishing system (AFES), which uses fire wires to 
detect the presence of fires. The detection of fire automatically triggers the 
activation of the fire extinguishing system to put out the fire quickly. 
(4) Passive Damage Suppression  
Both active and passive damage suppression seek to minimize the effects 
of any damage caused by a hostile damage mechanism. The key difference 
between the two techniques is that passive damage suppression does not 
require the use of sensors to detect the impact of a damage mechanism. An 
example is self-sealing fuel tanks, where the interaction between the 
leaking fuel (due to a puncture) and the fuel tank material results in 
swelling of the fuel tank that seals the puncture. 
(5) Component Shielding 
In component shielding, engineers use armor materials to protect critical 
components from a hostile damage mechanism. Component shielding is 
prevalent on GCVs, in the form of heavy passive armor. The main 
drawback of component shielding is that the GCV can incur significant 
weight penalties due to the additional armor. The weight penalty limits the 
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protected area of the ground vehicle. Engineers can use integrated armor, 
which involves building the armor into the structure of the GCV, to help 
minimize the weight penalty. Engineers can also use parasitic armor as an 
alternative, which involves adding armor to the GCV as external modules. 
While parasitic armor incurs more weight penalty compared to integrated 
armor, parasitic armor is typically easier and cheaper to replace and/or 
upgrade than integrated armor. 
(6) Component Elimination or Replacement 
Since a system is vulnerable because its “critical components are 
vulnerable” (Ball 2003, 14), one can eliminate or replace a critical 
component with a less vulnerable one to reduce overall system 
vulnerability. For example, one can replace the hydraulic turret drive 
systems onboard GCVs with electrical turret drive systems. A hydraulic 
turret drive releases high-pressure hydraulic fluids when hit by a damage 
mechanism, which results in catastrophic fires. One can use electric turret 
drives that do not require any high-pressure hydraulic fluids to eliminate 
this risk and reduce overall system vulnerability. (2003) 
 
This chapter provided an overview on what constitutes system survivability 
(susceptibility and vulnerability) and presented the possible techniques that are applicable 
to reduce system susceptibility and vulnerability. The subsequent chapters discuss in 
further detail what constitutes a ground combat vehicle and the conventional approach to 
ground combat vehicle survivability. 
  
 11 
III. GROUND COMBAT VEHICLES AND THEIR CAPABILITIES 
Military planners require GCVs to engage and destroy enemy forces, to facilitate 
a swift conclusion of ground military operations. In order to fulfill this role, engineers 
typically design GCVs to be highly mobile, heavily armed and highly protected. 
Engineers mount a wide variety of weapons on GCVs, which range from small-caliber 
cannons (e.g., 20mm automatic cannon found on some IFVs) to large-caliber, high-
velocity guns (e.g., 120mm gun on a MBT). Military planners may also require GCVs to 
have missile launchers to complement their gun system (e.g., the M2 Bradley IFV carries 
anti-armor missiles to allow the Bradley to engage MBTs). Military planners and 
engineers often refer to GCVs as armored fighting vehicles (AFV) because GCVs 
traditionally depend on heavy passive armor to survive. For mobility, engineers usually 
equip GCVs with tracked systems to allow the vehicles to move fast and maneuver 
quickly over both smooth roads and rough terrain (tracks have large surface area, which 
reduces ground pressure even for heavy AFVs). Nevertheless, engineers also utilize 
wheeled systems on GCVs, particularly those that operate primarily over relatively 
smooth cross-country and/or in urban areas. GCVs typically have a minimum of three 
crewmembers, namely a driver, a gunner and a vehicle commander. For GCVs such as 
MBTs and tank destroyers, military planners typically require the presence of a loader as 
the fourth crewmember, to handle the bulky ammunition for the large-caliber gun. 
Military planners and engineers generally classify GCVs into two categories: those that 
transport troops, such as armored personnel carriers (APC), infantry carrying vehicles 
(ICV), and IFVs; and those that do not, such as MBTs, tank destroyers and self-propelled 
artillery.  
This author has worked on armored fighting vehicle programs for the past eight 
years. Based on this author’s experience, there are three main essential capabilities for a 
GCV, namely mobility, lethality and survivability.  
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A. MOBILITY 
Military planners and engineers refer to mobility as the ability of a ground combat 
vehicle to move about freely in the designated operational environment to accomplish the 
operational objectives. According to Khalil and Hitchcock (1998), there are three levels 
of mobility, namely strategic, operational and tactical:  
Strategic mobility is the ability of the vehicle to move or be moved into 
the operational theatre. This implies that lighter and smaller vehicles have 
greater strategic mobility. Operational mobility is the ability of the 
vehicles to move by their own power at various speeds. Tactical mobility 
or battlefield mobility is the ability of the vehicle to move over various 
terrains and obstacles such as ditches, trenches and streams. The 
operational and tactical mobility requirements are extreme but necessary 
because the vehicle must be able to operate in various military 
environments. (2) 
Military planners and engineers have to decide carefully on whether a ground 
combat vehicle adopts wheels or tracks for mobility, as the decision affects the 
operational capability of the vehicle. Based on this author’s experience, combat vehicles 
generally adopt tracked systems, while tactical vehicles generally adopt wheeled systems. 
Nevertheless, this author wishes to highlight that there are exceptions to this general rule 
of thumb such as the Centuro tank destroyer, which is a wheeled vehicle. Military 
analysts and planners have performed many studies since 1985 in an attempt to answer 
“The Wheel Versus Track Dilemma.” (Hornback 1998, 34) In his article, Hornback 
presents a summary of the “key advantages demonstrated by wheeled and tracked 
platforms based on thirty years of Army tests and studies” (34), as seen in Figure 2. 
Based on Figure 2, it is not surprising that military planners and engineers generally 
prefer tracked systems for combat vehicles, due to the superior cross-country and 
obstacle clearing capability. Nevertheless, Figure 2 also shows that wheeled systems are 
generally quieter and lighter, as well as easier and cheaper to maintain. Therefore, based 
on this author’s experience, militaries are increasingly looking at wheeled systems, 
especially with the advent of urban operations and the continuing technological 
improvements in wheeled systems (e.g., tires that can be inflated or deflated to improve 
cross-country and obstacle clearing performance). 
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Figure 2.  Different Advantages of Tracked and Wheeled Vehicles. Source: 
Hornback (1998, 34). 
B. LETHALITY 
Based on this author’s experience, another essential capability for ground combat 
vehicles is the ability to engage and defeat the anticipated hostile threats in the 
operational environment. This author wishes to stress that lethality is dependent on both 
the weapon system performance as well as on the ability of the sensors onboard the 
ground combat vehicle to detect, recognize and identify (DRI) quickly and accurately 
potential targets. In order to minimize the amount of time that a GCV requires to DRI and 
engage a target, engineers typically equip ground vehicles with advanced sighting 
systems (both thermal and day sight) that are coupled to a fully stabilized fire control 
system, which allows the ground vehicle to accurately engage threats even on the move 
and under adverse weather conditions. Engineers equip ground vehicles with weapon 
systems that commensurate with the expected target sets for the ground vehicles. 
Therefore, engineers equip MBTs and tank destroyers with large-caliber, high-velocity 
guns as their target sets includes the most well protected targets (such as other MBTs and 
fortified enemy positions). On the other hand, engineers equip APCs, IFVs and ICVs 
with smaller caliber guns (typically ranging from 12.7mm to 40mm) because the main 
function of such vehicles is to transport troops and therefore, their target sets comprises 
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primarily of less well protected targets such as other APCs/IFVs/ICVs, trucks and enemy 
soldiers.  
C. SURVIVABILITY 
Military planners and analysts generally view survivability as the most essential 
capability for a ground vehicle today. Defence iQ recently surveyed 205 senior 
executives and professionals within the armored vehicle domain, and the survey revealed 
that the top-ranked attribute or capability for armored vehicles was protection against 
ballistic and blast threats (Andrew and Richard 2015). According to the survey: “The 
message is clear: Protection, protection, protection. Almost half of respondents identified 
ballistic protection as a critical requirement while 58% viewed IED protection as the key 
attribute” (Andrew and Richard 2015, 13). 
This author believes that it is not surprising for survivability to be the most 
important of the three essential capabilities, considering that survivability has the most 
direct correlation to overall mission cost effectiveness. A survivable vehicle has a higher 
probability of successfully completing a mission and returning safely. Military planners 
can then use the vehicle repeatedly for subsequent missions and thus, enhance the overall 
mission cost effectiveness. A survivable vehicle also results in fewer friendly casualties, 
which is a major political issue, as the recent conflicts in the Middle East amply 
demonstrate. To illustrate the importance of survivability, the U.S. Army had previously 
spent about US$45B (Tadjdeh 2012) on mine resistant ambush protected (MRAP) 
vehicles, which leverage primarily passive armor and vehicle shaping (e.g., V-shaped 
hull) to protect soldiers against mine and IED threats in the Middle East. To put the cost 
of the MRAP program into perspective, this author estimates that US$45B is sufficient 
for one to procure about 300 F-22 stealth fighters, which is the most advanced aircraft in 
the world today (according to the U.S. Air Force’s 2011 budget estimates, the flyaway 
cost of an F-22 is about US$150M). In this author’s opinion, due to the excessively high 
casualties in the conflicts, the U.S. Army had little choice but to make the huge 
investment on the MRAPs, even though the MRAPs have little utility as GCVs 
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subsequently (due to their heavy weight and the corresponding lack of lethality and cross-
country mobility). 
In this author’s opinion, mobility, lethality and survivability are high-level 
capabilities that any ground vehicle must possess. Military planners and engineers then 
translate these high-level capabilities into various lower-level capabilities. Christopher 
Adams, a lecturer at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, presented some of these 
lower-level capabilities in his lecture on combat survivability (see Table 1). In addition, 
this author wishes to highlight that incorporating different capabilities into a ground 
combat vehicle ultimately affects the overall cost-effectiveness of the vehicle, and 
military planners today regard cost-effectiveness as a key consideration for defense 
programs.  
Table 1.   Important Capabilities for GCVs. Source: Adams (2016). 
Safe to operate and 
maintain 




Carry a large and/or heavy 
payload over a long 
distance without refueling 
Provide effective and rapid 
protective and supporting 
fire day and night while 
stationary and moving—fire 
and maneuver 
Effective communications 
between mounted and 
dismounted elements 
Operate with few logistic 
and support requirements 
Tolerable internal air and 
visibility environment 
Operate with few 
crewmembers 
Traverse most of the 
world’s roads, bridges, and 
tunnels  
Self-recovery, towing, and 
towed capabilities 
Quick, easy, and infrequent 
maintenance and repair 
Tolerable ride Easy deployment and transport 
Quickly and accurately 




Operate in extreme hot/
cold/wet/dusty 
environments 
Move and maneuver 
quickly, in tight places, and 
over rough and wet terrain 
Precise navigation Fuel efficient Easy to produce, modular 
Longevity Reliable Long mission endurance 
Sufficient internal space for 
all 
Carry and control 
unmanned systems Easy to drive 
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IV. GROUND COMBAT VEHICLE SURVIVABILITY 
The previous chapter discussed what constitutes a ground combat vehicle and the 
key capabilities of a ground combat vehicle. Since military planners and analysts regard 
survivability as the most important capability of a ground vehicle, this chapter discusses 
the survivability approach for ground vehicles.  
A. SURVIVABILITY ONION 
Based on this author’s experience, military planners and engineers generally 
depict the survivability concept behind GCVs by using the “survivability onion” (see 
Figure 3). The first four layers of the onion deal with susceptibility reduction as they aim 
to prevent a hostile threat from hitting the vehicle (note the multiple use of the word 
“avoid”). The final two layers deal with vulnerability reduction, as they seek to prevent a 
hostile threat from killing the vehicle, after the threat hits the vehicle.  
 
Figure 3.  Different Layers of the Survivability Onion. Source: Kempinski and 
Murphy (2012). 
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1. Destroy Enemies Beyond Their Engagement Range 
This is the outermost layer of the survivability onion. This author thinks that this 
layer links to the susceptibility reduction concepts of threat warning and situational 
awareness as well as threat suppression. Troops can use advanced long-range sensors and 
weaponry to detect and eliminate enemy threats before the threats can close in and 
engage friendly forces. According to Kempinski and Murphy (2012), military planners 
envisaged the now cancelled Future Combat Systems (FCS) to rely primarily on this 
outer layer of protection. Consequently, military planners hoped for the FCS vehicles to 
carry significantly lesser armor, making the vehicles lighter and more mobile. The U.S. 
Army previously touted this concept as “trading armor for situational awareness.” 
Unfortunately, Kempinski and Murphy (2012) highlighted that the recent experiences in 
Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrated “it may be impossible to establish sufficient 
situational awareness to avoid many engagements” (21). This is especially true in an 
urban conflict scenario, where there are many places for threats to hide and to avoid 
detection (including posing as civilians) before performing surprise attacks on friendly 
forces.  
2. Avoid Being Detected 
This is the next layer of the survivability onion. This author thinks that this layer 
links to the susceptibility reduction concept of signature reduction. A GCV emits various 
signatures such as visual, thermal, radar, acoustic, vibrations and dust that are detectable 
by enemy sensors. Thus, engineers can reduce some or all of these detectable signatures 
to minimize the probability that a hostile threat detects the ground vehicles.  
Engineers utilize signature reduction extensively on aircraft, particularly low-
observable or “stealth” aircraft such as the F-117 and F-22. Based on this author’s 
experience, however, while one can implement signature reduction on GCVs, it is more 
difficult due to the larger number of signatures that require managing, as compared to an 
aircraft. For example, it is particularly difficult for engineers to eliminate or minimize the 
dust trail that ground vehicles generate, especially in a hot and dry environment. Dust 
trails are not an issue for aircraft. In terms of radar signature, while one can use radar-
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absorbing material (RAM) to reduce the radar signature of a GCV, the material is 
expensive to procure and maintain. Coupled with the routine damage that ground vehicles 
sustain in their operational environments, especially urban, it can be prohibitively 
expensive for military planners to maintain and replace the RAM on a regular basis for 
ground vehicles. One can also shape a ground vehicle appropriately to attempt to 
minimize reflected radar energy, but this makes design and integration of armor on the 
vehicle more difficult. 
3. Avoid Being Engaged 
If a hostile threat detects the ground vehicle, the next layer is to prevent the threat 
from engaging the vehicle. This author thinks that this layer links to the susceptibility 
reduction concepts of tactics and performance. Operators can use natural or man-made 
obstacles to shield or mask their vehicles from enemy fire. Operators can also perform 
berm drills, which involve moving from a “hide position” to the berm to engage the 
enemy, and quickly returning to the “hide position” to avoid enemy counter fire (see 
Figure 4). In this author’s opinion, the key limitation of these tactics is the requirement of 
large amounts of maneuver space and therefore, they are useful primarily for 
engagements over open terrain. Thus, it is more difficult for ground combat vehicles to 
execute such tactics in the confined constraints of an urban environment.  
 
Figure 4.  Illustration of the Berm Drill Tactic. Source: Cooke (2004). 
4. If Engaged, Avoid Being Hit 
If a hostile threat engages the vehicle, the next layer of the survivability onion is 
to prevent the incoming threat from hitting the vehicle. This author thinks that this layer 
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links to the susceptibility reduction concepts of threat suppression, expendables, tactics 
and performance, as well as noise jamming and deception. 
As in aircraft, a ground vehicle can utilize evasive maneuvers as a tactic to 
minimize the probability of hit. In order to be effective, this tactic requires sufficient 
maneuver space as well as good vehicle mobility characteristics, and therefore, it is more 
suitable for engagements over open terrain than urban terrain. In this author’s opinion, 
this tactic is also unlikely to be useful against modern, high-speed anti-armor threats such 
as supersonic missiles and kinetic energy penetrators. 
Active protection is a relatively new and upcoming development in the field of hit 
avoidance. Dieter and Wagner (2009) classify active protection systems (APS) into soft-
kill APS and hard-kill APS. This author thinks that soft-kill APS utilizes the 
susceptibility reduction concept of noise jamming and deception, while hard-kill APS 
utilizes the threat suppression concept. According to Dieter and Wagner, a key limitation 
of the soft-kill APS is that it is useful only useful against guided weapons, and engineers 
need to optimize the soft-kill APS to counter specific threats (2009). For example, one 
cannot use an infrared jammer to counter a radar-guided missile. Thus, Dieter and 
Wagner (2009) stress that soft-kill APS is not a “catch-all” system that one can use to 
defend against the entire spectrum of threats. Kempinski and Murphy (2012) highlights 
another key limitation of soft-kill APS, which is the jamming causes mutual interference 
with friendly electronic and communication systems. Soldiers encountered this issue 
when they employed broadband or barrage jamming in Iraq and Afghanistan to counter 
IEDs. 
The hard-kill APS addresses the shortcomings of the soft-kill APS by using 
physical countermeasures to intercept and destroy incoming threats before they hit the 
vehicle. As such, the hard-kill APS is effective against a wide spectrum of threats, 
ranging from projectiles to guided weapons. 
.  
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5. If Hit, Withstand Penetration 
The last two layers of the survivability onion deals with vulnerability reduction. If 
a hostile threat hits the ground vehicle, vulnerability reduction helps to mitigate the 
damage and increase the probability of survival. Engineers typically use physical armor 
to prevent a damage mechanism from penetrating the system and causing damage to 
internal critical components (such as the crew). Based on this author’s experience, there 
are two main types of physical armor: 
1. Passive armor seeks to minimize or prevent penetration of the damage 
mechanism by relying solely on the material properties of the armor. The 
earliest form of passive armor was armored steel, which became obsolete 
as threat lethality increased over the years. Engineers design modern 
passive armors to be composite in nature, meaning that they comprise of 
different layers of materials, such as armored steel, Kevlar and ceramics. 
The exact composition and layout of composite armors is highly classified 
and usually only a very select group of personnel knows the details of the 
armor. 
2. Reactive armor relies on the detonation of a small explosive charge to 
disrupt or to deflect the damage mechanism. The most common reactive 
armor is the explosive reactive armor (ERA). Engineers design ERA 
specifically to disrupt the shaped charge jet found in high explosive anti-
tank (HEAT) warheads. Figure 5 illustrates the working principle behind 
the ERA. The impact of a shaped charge jet generates sufficient energy to 
detonate the explosive liners, which causes the faceplates to expand in two 
opposite directions and thus, eroding and disrupting the shaped charge jet 





Figure 5.  Working Principles Behind ERA. Source: Hebert (2005). 
6. If Penetrated, Withstand Being Killed 
Physical armor minimizes or prevents penetration by a damage mechanism, but it 
is still possible for a damage mechanism to cause critical damage to internal components 
without penetrating the armor. Engineers commonly refer to this effect as spalling, which 
is the ejection of “fragments, shards or splinters that detach from surfaces as a result of 
rapid deformation from pressure, expansion, a blow or explosion” (Erbil, Eksi and Bircan 
2011, 1). Figure 6 illustrates the serious effects of spalling to critical components inside a 
ground vehicle, such as the crew. Based on this author’s experience, engineers typically 
install spall liners behind the physical armor of a ground vehicle to reduce the spray zone 




Figure 6.  Spalling Inside a Vehicle. Source: Erbil, Eksi and Bircan (2011). 
Besides using spall liners, engineers also use other survivability features on GCVs 
to minimize the probability of a kill when hit. One example is the replacement of 
hydraulic turret drives with electrical turret drives. When a damage mechanism impacts a 
hydraulic system, the leaking, high pressure hydraulic fluid usually results in internal 
fires. Engineers eliminate this hazard by replacing the hydraulic turret drives with 
electrical turret drives. Another example is the storage of ammunition in heavily armored 
compartments, equipped with blast-off panels. When a damage mechanism results in 
inadvertent detonation of the ammunition, the blast-off panels provide the detonation 
energy with a path of least resistance. This results in the detonation energy venting out of 




B. CONVENTIONAL APPROACH TO GROUND COMBAT VEHICLE 
SURVIVABILITY 
Military planners and engineers generally depend on passive armor to protect 
GCVs. The most common method used by engineers involves casting the vehicle 
structure out of a homogeneous material such as armored steel or aluminum. Engineers 
then add additional layers of material as needed to meet the survivability requirement. As 
such, engineers typically define the protection level of a vehicle by the equivalent 
thickness of rolled homogeneous armor (usually denoted by mm of RHA). In order to 
counter increases in threat lethality, engineers simply thickened the armor over the years, 
and this method was effective until the 1970s.  
By the 1970s, there was widespread proliferation of highly capable anti-armor 
missiles and rockets utilizing shaped charge warheads. These weapons revolutionized 
anti-armor warfare due to their portability and effectiveness in penetrating homogenous 
materials, especially armored steel. Based on this author’s experience, early versions of 
shaped charge warheads can reliably penetrate more than 200 mm of armored steel, while 
modern versions can penetrate more than 1,000 mm of armored steel. Considering the 
relatively high density of armored steel, one can conclude that it was no longer feasible 
for engineers to continue adding additional armored steel to counter the increasingly 
lethal threats, as the weight penalty incurred severely compromises other platform 
capabilities. Since there was no acceptable armor solution then to counter the advanced 
shaped charge warheads, military planners and engineers deliberately designed some 
GCVs with less armor to make them lighter and more mobile and thus, decreasing the 
probability that shaped charge weapons can hit the vehicles. Examples include the 
German Leopard 1 MBT and the French AMX30 MBT, which prioritized mobility over 
armor protection. 
As materials technology improved, engineers managed to design composite armor 
to replace homogenous armor. Based on this author’s experience, the main advantage of 
composite armor is better weight efficiency compared to traditional armored steel. This 
means that given the same armor thickness, composite armors have lower vulnerability 
compared to armored steel. Despite the good weight efficiencies of existing composite 
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armors, equipping them still results in significant weight penalty on ground vehicles. The 
most well protected vehicles today are the MBTs and they already weigh upwards of 
70,000kg even with advanced composite armor. Therefore, this author believes that 
GCVs have reached their realistic weight and size limits and short of a complete 
revolution in materials technology, it is not possible to continue adding more armor 
weight to counter future increases in threat lethality.  
Military planners and engineers typically rely on reactive armor to protect lighter 
vehicles against modern threats. Engineers designed reactive armor to defeat shaped 
charge warheads. This means that reactive armor is ineffective against other threats such 
as kinetic energy (KE) penetrators. In addition, engineers also attempt to counter reactive 
armor by incorporating tandem shaped charge warheads into rockets and missiles. 
Tandem missiles and rockets have two warheads, namely a precursor warhead and a main 
warhead. The precursor warhead sits in front of the main warhead (hence the name 
“tandem”) and its purpose is to detonate the ERA, which clears the way for the main 
warhead to attack the vehicle. Nevertheless, the U.S., Israeli and Russian armies still 
widely deploy reactive armor as it is a relatively lightweight, low-cost and low-
complexity solution compared to advanced composite armors (Kempinski and Murphy 
2012).  
Besides reactive armor, engineers can also equip lighter vehicles with slat or bar 
armor to protect them against shaped charge warheads (see Figure 7). According to 
Kempinski and Murphy, engineers optimize the spacing between the bars of the slat 
armor to counter specific threats (2012). This means that slat armor is only effective 
against specific threats and is ineffective against most other threats. In addition, based on 
this author’s experience, slat armor only provides variable protection, as the probability 




Figure 7.  Slat Armor on a Stryker ICV. Source: Defense Update (2006). 
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V. URBAN OPERATIONS 
This chapter seeks to provide an overview of urban operations and explains why 
urban operations are dominating current and future conflicts. This chapter also discusses 
the key challenges facing GCVs operating in urban environments and presents vignettes 
of actual urban conflicts to illustrate the challenges. 
A. IMPETUS 
The world is undergoing a period of rapid urbanization. Merriam-Webster defines 
urbanization as “The process by which towns and cities are formed, and become larger as 
more and more people begin living and working in central areas.” This is particularly 
evident in developing countries where people are rapidly moving from rural areas to 
cities to work and to live. In 2014, the United Nations (UN) provided some key statistics 
on world urbanization: 
1. The UN estimates that 54% of the world’s population is currently living in 
urban areas. In comparison, only 30% of the world’s population was living 
in urban areas in 1950. The UN expects the percentage to increase to about 
66% by 2060. 
2. The most urbanized areas in the world today are North America (82%), 
Latin America (80%), the Caribbean (80%) and Europe (73%). Asia and 
Africa, on the other hand, only have 40% and 48% respectively of their 
populations living in urban areas. Urbanization will continue to increase 
across the globe, however, with Asia and Africa being the main drivers. 
By 2050, the UN expects the degree of urbanization in Africa and Asia to 
increase to 56% and 64%, respectively. 
3. In terms of population growth, the UN expects world population to 
increase by 2.5 billion people by 2050, with the increase concentrated 
primarily in Asia and Africa (about 90%). 
B. DESCRIPTION OF URBAN OPERATIONS 
Against this backdrop of global urbanization and population growth, it is not 
surprising that military planners consider urban operations to form a major part of 
military operations today and in the future. According to the U.S. Army, urban operations 
are often full spectrum in nature, ranging from offensive and defensive operations to 
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stability and support operations (see Figure 8). Offensive and defensive operations 
typically target both regular and irregular forces (insurgents), while stability and support 
operations (e.g., Iraq and Afghanistan) typically target irregular forces (after defeating the 
regular forces), with the ultimate aim of winning the support of the local populace.  
 
Figure 8.  Full Spectrum Nature of Urban Operations. Source: U.S. Army 
(2006). 
Urban operations are not new to military planners as, historically, urban areas 
have been central to military operations. In modern history, many battles occurred in 
urban areas, ranging from Stalingrad and Berlin during World War II, to Beirut, 
Chechnya, Iraq and Afghanistan in more recent times. Thus, with the increasing trend of 
global urbanization, planning for urban operations is critical to the execution and success 
of any military campaign.  
The U.S. Army describes the urban environment as a multi-dimensional 
battlefield, which comprises various horizontal and vertical structures, as well as surfaces 
and sub-surfaces (see Figure 9). As is evident from Figure 9, enemy forces can attack 
from a multitude of directions, often with little or no warning. Based on this author’s 
experience, the key challenges facing GCVs operating in an urban environment include: 
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1. Lack of Situational Awareness 
Unlike open terrain, where crewmembers operate primarily in the “hatch-out” 
mode for better situational awareness, crewmembers typically conduct urban operations 
from inside their vehicles. This is to counter enemy snipers who are lurking in an urban 
environment. The presence of multiple buildings in an urban environment results in 
obscured or poor all-round vision, which affects the ability of crewmembers to detect 
threats and respond accordingly. In addition, weapon systems and their corresponding 
sighting systems on ground vehicles today typically can only elevate up to 50°, which 
limits the vehicle’s ability to detect and engage targets that pop out from high-rise 
buildings. These limitations severely impair the ability of the crew to have coherent 
situational awareness in an urban environment.  
Ground vehicles typically use electronic surveillance systems such as cameras and 
thermal imagers to help improve the situational awareness of the crewmembers in an 
urban environment. Unfortunately, the buildings and layout of an urban area significantly 
degrades the effectiveness of the electronic surveillance systems. For example, a small 
and well-positioned threat is able to stay concealed within buildings and structures, 
making it very difficult for electronic surveillance systems to detect the threat. As long as 
the threat stays concealed within the buildings or structures, it is largely immune to 
detection from overhead imaging assets (such as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles) and from 
ground-based imaging assets found on vehicles. Thus, the threat can creep up undetected 
and carry out surprise attacks on the ground vehicles from unexpected directions. Any 
significant volume of civilian movement within an urban environment also provides 
threats with a certain degree of camouflage and concealment, thus making detection 
difficult. 
Since threat warning and situational awareness is a key susceptibility reduction 
technique, the lack of this in an urban environment increases the susceptibility of ground 
combat vehicles and reduces their survivability. 
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2. Increased Signature 
The size and the acoustic and vibratory signatures of ground vehicles (especially 
armored vehicles) make concealing them nearly impossible. The large number of 
concealed surveillance sites in an urban environment also makes it very difficult for 
friendly forces to mask their movements. Enemy forces can easily see and hear an 
incoming ground force in advance before it reaches the urban area, thus allowing 
sufficient time for the enemy to prepare for the likely attack direction and to plan 
coordinated attacks against the incoming ground force. Enemy sensors can also easily 
acquire ground vehicles via other means such as detecting the radar and thermal 
signatures of the vehicles. Ground vehicles have substantial radar and thermal signatures 
due to their shape and geometry, as well as their need for large engines that generate a lot 
of heat (GCVs are very heavy and require large engines to provide the necessary 
mobility). Since signature reduction or management is a key susceptibility reduction 
technique, this increase in signature increases the susceptibility of ground combat 
vehicles and reduces their survivability. 
3. Lack of Mobility 
Depending on the layout of the urban environment, ground vehicles can encounter 
multiple choke points that impede their mobility when advancing toward the objective. 
Examples include weight loading of bridges, constrictions due to narrow roads and the 
general layout of road networks. The confined nature of an urban environment also 
makes maneuvering difficult, which limits the options that ground vehicles have in 
evading threats. Since tactics and performance (such as mobility performance) is a key 
susceptibility reduction technique, the lack of mobility and maneuverability in an urban 
environment increases the susceptibility of ground combat vehicles and reduces their 
survivability. 
4. High Risk of Collateral Damage 
Due to the close confines of an urban environment, military commanders may 
place restrictions on ground combat vehicles to minimize the probability of collateral 
damage as well as the risk to friendly forces. These restrictions can adversely affect the 
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effectiveness of some susceptibility reduction techniques, which decreases the 
survivability of the ground combat vehicles. For example, military commanders may 
forbid the automatic deployment of smoke grenades to counter an incoming threat. This 
is because of the possibility of setting nearby structures on fire and the potential health 
hazards of the smoke to surrounding civilians and friendly soldiers. Military commanders 
can also impose restrictions on the use of hard-kill APS in an urban environment. 
Friendly troops tend to be in much closer proximity to the ground combat vehicles when 
operating in an urban environment. Therefore, the activation of an APS countermeasure 
to intercept an incoming threat has a high probability of injuring or killing nearby 
soldiers, as well as innocent civilians. 
 
Figure 9.  Depiction of an Urban Environment as a Multi-Dimensional 
Battlefield. Source: U.S. Army (2006). 
C. VIGNETTES OF ACTUAL URBAN OPERATIONS 
Due to the urban environment’s ability to mitigate numerical and technological 
disadvantages, it is not surprising that irregular forces favor urban combat. Examples 
from Chechnya and the West Bank illustrate the key challenges that all ground combat 
vehicles face when operating in an urban environment. 
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1. Battle of Grozny  
Russia initiated this battle in 1994 to quell the ongoing civil war in Chechnya 
following the fall of the Soviet Union. The Russians first conducted heavy aerial and 
artillery bombardment of the city to eliminate any potential hiding spots for the Chechen 
separatists and to erode the separatists’ will and means to fight by overwhelming them 
with superior technology. After this, Russia initiated a large-scale ground campaign, 
supported by armored vehicles and helicopter gunships, to take over the city. Compared 
to the separatists, Russia was technologically and numerically superior. Nevertheless, 
contrary to expectations, the Russians suffered greatly during the battle as the Chechen 
separatists were in prepared positions throughout the city and battled the Russian’s 
mechanized forces with low-tech weapons such as RPGs to great success. According to 
Thomas (1999), the Russians greatly respected the RPGs employed by the separatists, 
due to the multiplicity of uses ranging from engaging troop formations as an area 
weapon, to a precision weapon fired directly at vehicles. Thomas also credits the tactical 
deployment of the Chechen separatists on multiple floors in the remnants of the buildings 
as a key strategy, as this allowed the Chechen separatists to engage Russian forces 
without themselves being targeted (1999). The separatists knew the elevation limits of the 
mounted sensors and weapon systems on the Russian vehicles, and they exploited this 
limitation to the maximum effect. Thomas also claims that the assimilation of 
commercially available equipment such as the cellphones enabled the separatists to 
maintain reliable communications (i.e., good threat warning and situational awareness) 
and to use the cellphones as a means of remote IED detonation (1999). Although the 
Russian forces eventually secured the city, the guerilla tactics employed by the Chechen 
separatists were overwhelmingly successful, and the separatists inflicted significant 
losses on the Russian forces in both man and materiel.  
2. Operation Defensive Shield  
The Israel Defense Force (IDF) conducted this operation in the West Bank region 
in 2002 where there was constant conflict between the local Palestinian populace and the 
IDF. The Palestinian insurgency posed serious challenges to the IDF due to the constant 
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terror and guerilla elements employed within the villages and cities in the region. During 
the operation to reestablish IDF control over the major cities in the West Bank, the IDF 
found themselves in the midst of an urban battle. The operation was made more 
complicated when the insurgents started hiding them themselves among the local civilian 
population, which contributed significantly to the fog of war. The IDF decided to 
dispatch a joint deployment of ground vehicles and infantry troops to conduct house-to-
house operations, instead of relying on heavy artillery and air strikes. This was necessary 
to minimize civilian casualties and any unnecessary collateral damages. Similar to the 
Russians in Chechnya, the highly trained and well-equipped IDF found itself 
maneuvering through a city that was extensively booby-trapped, and insurgents often 
attacked the IDF from multiple directions. Although the insurgents had only obsolete 
anti-tank weapons and grenades, they managed to impede the progress of the IDF by 
taking full advantage of the urban terrain to coordinate ambushes and by using IEDs. 
These asymmetric tactics in an urban setting largely negated the IDF’s technological and 
training advantages and skewed the battle favorably toward the insurgents. 
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VI. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING APPROACH  
The previous chapters provided an overview on system survivability and 
discussed the conventional approach to ground combat vehicle survivability. Due to 
increasing threat lethality and the prevalence of asymmetric urban operations, it is no 
longer possible for military planners and engineers to rely solely on the conventional 
survivability approach, which focuses on vulnerability reduction Thus, this thesis 
suggests for the exploration of alternative means to enhance survivability. A systems 
engineering approach facilitates this process. Systems engineering provides a structured 
and systemic methodology to understand and analyze customer needs, to develop the 
required system functionalities, to determine the system requirements and to guide the 
subsequent development, verification and validation process. According to Blanchard and 
Fabrycky (2003), Winston Royce developed the systems engineering Waterfall model in 
1970 (see Figure 10). This author modified the Royce model to guide the systems 
engineering process for this thesis (see Figure 11). Even though this thesis focuses 
primarily on the survivability aspect of a ground combat vehicle, this author looks at the 
design of a ground combat vehicle in its entirety. This is because even though 
survivability is a key capability for ground combat vehicles, it is not a stand-alone 
capability. This means that enhancing the survivability of a ground vehicle often results 




Figure 10.  Systems Engineering Waterfall Model. Source: Blanchard and 
Fabrycky (2003). 
 
Figure 11.  Modified Systems Engineering Waterfall Model. 
A. THREAT ANALYSIS 
A ground combat vehicle faces a myriad of threats in an urban environment. In 
order for engineers to devise suitable survivability systems, engineers first need to 
understand the types and characteristics of threats that the vehicle is facing. Chapter VII 
presents the threat analysis and assessment. 
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B. PROBLEM DEFINITION 
Ground combat vehicles today lack survivability when operating in an urban 
environment. As demonstrated by recent conflicts, military planners and engineers can no 
longer rely solely on vulnerability reduction. Threats come from any direction in an urban 
environment, which means that it is no longer viable for engineers to optimize protection 
only in the vehicle frontal arc. In addition, while military planners and engineers can 
equip ground vehicles with advanced composite armor with good weight efficiencies, 
these armors still incur significant weight penalties on ground vehicles. Therefore, only 
the heaviest class of ground vehicles (i.e., MBTs) has sufficient weight budget to equip 
these armors. Nevertheless, based on this author’s experience, MBTs today already weigh 
upwards of 70,000kg, and it is not possible to continue adding more armor to counter 
increasingly lethal threats and threat scenarios. Therefore, military planners and engineers 
need to explore alternative means of enhancing ground combat vehicle survivability.  
C. STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS 
Proper stakeholder management is critical to the success of any project. 
Stakeholder analysis seeks to identify the various parties that have a vested interest in the 
system, in order to determine and analyze their needs. More often than not, a system has 
multiple stakeholders and due to resource limitations, it is not feasible for one to devote 
equal attention to every single stakeholder. Thus, it is also important for one to be able to 
prioritize attention to stakeholders based on their level of interest, as well as their level of 
influence on the system. For the GCV, this thesis classifies the key stakeholders into five 
main categories. Table 2 describes the various goals and concerns of the key 
stakeholders. 
1. Orchestrators and Regulators  
This generally refers to government, regulatory bodies and policy makers who are 
responsible for the approval of budget, time scheduling and overall direction of the entire 
project. Orchestrators and Regulators also act as the executive decision body who can 
veto the project at any given time should there be a need.  
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2. Researchers and Developers  
This is the group of people who perform the necessary engineering work to 
develop the GCV in accordance with the defined stakeholder needs and system 
requirements. This group includes the program management team, academia and defense 
contractors. 
3. Opponents  
This group of people is adversely affected by the success of the GCV. This group 
includes both the potential adversaries of the system and commercial competitors. 
4. End Users 
These are the actual operators of the GCV, and they are directly impacted by the 
success or failure of the system. 
5. Others 
This pertains to groups such as the public and the media who have an indirect 
interest in the system and can potentially result in a veto to the system should there be a 
critical mass of opposing sentiments. While the public does not have a direct influence on 
the GCV, the government needs to provide proper accounting of the GCV program to the 
public, due to the usage of taxpayer’s money. Similarly, the media can directly or 
indirectly influence the public’s perception of the system, which can result in widespread 
support or opposition to the system. 
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Table 2.   Key Stakeholders with Their Goals and Concerns. 
Category Stakeholder Goals Concerns 
Orchestrators 
and Regulators 
Government To maximize 
international political 
influence, by leveraging 
a strong military 
 
To ensure appropriate 
balance in 
governmental spending 
between military needs 
and other national 
needs 
-Support from the general 
public 
-Will the new system be 
regarded as overly 
aggressive and result in 
adverse regional/
international repercussions 
-Is taxpayer money 






To win any ground 
military operation, at 
minimal cost to both 
man and material 
-Support from politicians 
and the general public 
-Budget sufficiency 
-Potential loss of 
credibility and public 
confidence should the 
system be delayed or 
cancelled. 
End User Army To successfully execute 
ground military 
operations, as dictated 
by the DOD 
-Budget sufficiency  
-Failure, delay or 
cancellation could result 
in a serious capability gap 
especially if conflicts 
arise. Deterrence 







To develop and design 
a system that meets 
DOD’s requirement, 
within cost and budget 
-Technological feasibility 
and maturity 
-Availability of advanced 
technology, especially if 








To develop and design 
a system that meets 
DOD’s requirement, 
within cost and budget 
 
To make a profit 
 
To build a positive 
-Market competition 
-Failure to meet budget, 
schedule and performance, 
resulting in financial 
losses and loss of 
credibility 
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Category Stakeholder Goals Concerns 
reputation to facilitate 
subsequent business 




To ensure appropriate 
and prudent usage of 
taxpayer money 
-Prudent usage of public 
monies 
-Failure, delay or 
cancellation would mean 
taxpayers money was 
wasted 
Opponents Adversary To be able to defeat 
BLUE forces in any 
ground military 
operation 
National security and 
political leverage 
compromised due to 
inferior capability to 
BLUE forces 
 
This thesis then prioritizes the stakeholders based on the influence-interest matrix 
seen in Figure 12. The size of the bubbles indicates the relative influence of the 
stakeholders. Based on the location of the stakeholders in the matrix, this thesis proposes 
the following actions to manage the stakeholders: 
a. High Influence, High Interest—Manage Closely  
From the stakeholder analysis, it is clear that the Orchestrator and Regulator 
category has the most significant influence on the system. The government is the 
executive decision body with the prerogative to finance, support, influence or block the 
development of the GCV. The DOD provides high-level direction and provides the 
necessary funding for the program. Changes imposed by the government or DOD have an 
immediate and direct impact on the success of the program. Thus, it is critical for the 
program team to manage these two groups of key stakeholders closely.  
b. High Influence, Low Interest—Engage Proactively, and Keep 
Contented  
The public and media is in this category as they do not have any direct vested 
interest in the program. Despite this, it is important for the government to provide proper 
accounting to the public and media due to the involvement of taxpayer’s money. The 
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public and media have high influence because their support or opposition to the program 
can directly sway the political support and funding for the program. Thus, it is important 
for the government to find ways to engage the public and media on a regular basis.  
c. Low Influence, High Interest—Keep Informed of Decisions and 
Developments  
The day-to-day Army operators of the GCV have a high interest in the success of 
the GCV as they are the ultimate end-users. It is important for the program team to keep 
the Army operators informed of the status of the program, to allow the operators to 
develop the necessary tactics, training and procedures (TTPs). In addition, operators also 
bring valuable operational inputs to the program. 
d. Low Influence, Low Interest—Monitor and Be Aware of Developments  
Potential adversaries fit into this category as they do not have a direct influence 
on the success of the GCV program. It is also not possible for the program team to 
directly influence or manage potential adversaries. It is important, however, for the 
program team to constantly monitor and be aware of changes to the capabilities of 
potential adversaries as these can potentially result in changes to the system requirements 
for the GCV. 
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Figure 12.  Stakeholder Influence-Interest Matrix. 
D. EXTERNAL INTERACTIONS 
In order for one to derive the requirements for the GCV, it is important for one to 
first identify the key external entities that interact with the GCV in the operational 
environment. This thesis uses a context diagram (see Figure 13) to achieve this purpose. 
One can see that the external entities that interact with the GCV directly affect the 
susceptibility and hence, the survivability of a GCV.  
(1) Environment  
This includes both weather and terrain. This is a one-way input into the GCV, as 
weather and terrain affects how the GCV operates. Using this author’s home country as 
an example, the GCV needs to operate in a tropical wet climate and transverse cross-
country terrain composed of mud, sand and clay. The GCV also needs to be able to 
overcome different kinds of slopes as well as obstacles and shallow water bodies. The 
GCV also needs to operate effectively in urban terrain. One can link environment to the 
susceptibility reduction technique of tactics and performance. If military planners and 
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engineers do not design the GCV correctly for the operational environment, they will 
compromise the GCV’s ability to operate and maneuver in the operational environment, 
which reduces the GCV’s survivability.  
(2) Threats  
This includes both kinetic (projectile) and non-kinetic (rocket and missile) 
attacks, which are inputs into the GCV. When threats attack the GCV, they also give 
away their position, which is another input into the GCV. Correspondingly, once the 
GCV detects the threats, the GCV will proceed to engage and destroy the threats (output 
from the GCV). The threats directly affect the survivability measures that engineers need 
to design for the GCV. 
(3) Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle  
This provides localized situational awareness to the GCV. Higher headquarters 
(HHQ) usually controls the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and therefore, the GCV does 
not communicate directly with the UAV. Thus, the UAV only provides a one-way input 
(primarily real-time images and videos) to the GCV. One can link the tactical UAV to the 
susceptibility reduction technique of threat warning and situational awareness, as timely 
detection of threats allows the GCV to take appropriate actions to improve survivability. 
(4) Global Positioning System  
The global positioning system (GPS) provides one-way input (location data) to 
the GCV for navigational purposes. Most, if not all, military systems today rely on GPS 
as their primary source of navigational information. One can link GPS to the 
susceptibility reduction technique of threat warning and situational awareness. When 
GCVs are aware of their location, especially vis-a-vis the location of the enemy, the 
GCVs can employ appropriate actions to manage the enemy. 
(5) Indirect Fire Support  
Upon request from the GCVs, friendly artillery forces will provide indirect fire 
support to the GCVs. Thus, this is a two-way link between the GCV and the artillery 
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forces. One can link indirect fire support to the susceptibility reduction technique of 
threat suppression. The ability to degrade enemy forces before they can engage the GCVs 
improves the survivability of the GCVs. 
(6) Other Ground Assets  
The GCV operates as part of an integrated combat team, which includes other 
platforms as well. Thus, the GCV needs to be in constant communications (two-way) 
with the other platforms to coordinate activities. One can link an integrated combat team 
to the susceptibility reduction technique of tactics and performance. An integrated 
combat team typically contains elements that complement one another. For example, 
MBTs are able to destroy high priority enemy targets like other MBTs and fortified 
positions to minimize the threats against the combat team. On the other hand, MBTs have 
relatively poor all-round situational awareness that enemy infantry can exploit to attack 
the MBTs. Thus, ICVs and IFVs protect MBTs from enemy infantry to allow the MBTs 
to focus on destroying the high priority targets. Such tactics improve mission 
effectiveness and overall GCV survivability. 
(7) Headquarters  
HHQ provides command and control (C&C) to the GCV, while the GCV provides 
status updates to HHQ. Thus, this is a two-way link. One can link HHQ to the 
susceptibility reduction technique of threat warning and situational awareness. HHQ 
possesses the larger strategic picture and provides the GCV with the latest intelligence 
and instructions to facilitate prosecution of the ground operation. One can also link HHQ 
indirectly to threat suppression as the HHQ can request for long-range precision fires to 
support the GCVs. 
(8) Civilians  
The GCV operates in an urban environment, meaning that it will encounter 
civilians. The presence and actions of civilians in the immediate area of operations is a 
one-way input to the GCV, which has an effect on how the GCV operates (assuming that 
military commanders wish to minimize collateral damage). Examples include tightening 
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rules of engagement when civilians are around, as well as the increased difficulty in 
detecting insurgents who blend in with civilians. Therefore, the presence of civilians in 
an urban environment adversely affects the majority of the susceptibility reduction 
techniques. 
 
Figure 13.  Context Diagram for the GCV, Using MBT as an Example. 
E. OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS 
Figure 14 illustrates the high-level concept of operations (CONOPS) or OV-1 for 
the GCV. 
Before the GCVs can conduct any urban operations, the GCVs need to safely 
reach the urban objective first. Therefore, the first phase of the operation involves the 
GCVs moving out of the base camp as part of an armored combat team (ACT) and the 
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ACT maneuvering along the main axis (blue arrows) toward the objective. Overhead 
GPS provides the required navigational data to the ACT.  
As the ACT moves toward the objective, UAVs are actively seeking out enemy 
forces ahead of the ACT. This improves the situational awareness of the ACT, which 
reduces the susceptibility of the ACT to enemy attacks. Upon the detection of enemy 
forces, the UAVs will alert both the ACT and HHQ, who can request artillery fire to 
destroy and/or attrite the enemy before the ACT arrives. This standoff suppression of 
enemy threats reduces the quantity of enemy forces that the ACT needs to be engage, 
which leads to improved survivability for the ACT.  
Upon arriving at the urban objective, the GCVs first seek out and destroy high 
priority enemy assets such as MBTs and fortified positions using their long-range 
precision firepower. Besides the organic sensing capability of the GCVs, UAVs can also 
help to identify priority enemy assets for the GCVs to engage and destroy. Due to their 
superior protection capability, GCVs also act as the “hard-shield” for the ACT by 
drawing enemy fire away from the less protected elements of the ACT. All these 
activities maximize force preservation and facilitate the subsequent urban assault. 
Depending on the situation, GCVs can execute a variety of offensive maneuvers (e.g., 
envelopment, turning maneuver, penetration and frontal attack) to support the urban 
assault. For the envelopment and turning maneuver, GCVs utilize their mobility to 
quickly cut off key lines of communications and isolate the urban objective from any 
incoming reinforcements. For penetration and frontal attack, GCVs spearhead the assault 
and drive deep into the urban objective. 
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Figure 14.  OV-1 for GCV Movement to Objective and Eventual Assault. Adapted 
from Google Maps (2016). 
Based on the high-level CONOPS, one can determine the key operational 
activities that the GCV needs to conduct to achieve the mission objectives. One can 
depict these operational activities using an OV-5. Figure 15 shows the operational 
activities for the GCV mission presented using EFFBD, with the operational activities 
derived from the prior OV-1 description. There are three main threads in the OV-5, 
consisting of the main GCV mission, as well as the support from UAVs and friendly 
artillery forces for the main GCV mission.  
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Figure 15.  OV-5 for GCV Mission. 
F. FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 
SV-4 provides a graphical depiction of the system functional decomposition, 
which facilitates subsequent functional analysis. The SV-4 also facilitates the mapping of 
operational activities to the system functions. 
Figure 16 shows the functional decomposition of the GCV. The GCV conducts 
offensive ground operations and achieves this through six main sub-functions, namely (1) 
to maneuver, (2) to communicate, (3) to provide situational awareness (SA), (4) to protect 
system and crew, (5) to engage enemy and (6) to provide battle damage and assessment 
(BDA). One can trace the six main sub-functions to the three high-level capabilities for a 
ground combat vehicle, namely lethality, survivability and mobility. This author further 
decomposes some of the sub-functions to achieve the necessary resolution to facilitate 
subsequent functional analysis. Figures 17 and 18 show the complete decomposition of 
the functions “to communicate” and “to maneuver” respectively. In order to coordinate 
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activities, the GCV must be able to communicate with external air and ground assets as 
well as facilitate internal communications among the crewmembers. In order to maneuver 
to the objective, the GCV needs to be able to navigate itself as well as to move. In order 
to navigate, the GCV must receive location data, determine position based on the location 
data and minimize any navigational errors, which waste precious operational time. In 
order to move, the GCV must generate sufficient torque, speed and acceleration to ensure 
that it can overcome terrain and obstacles (both natural and man-made).  
 
Figure 16.  SV-4 for GCV. 
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Figure 17.  SV-4 Breakdown for “To Communicate.” 
 
 
Figure 18.  SV-4 Breakdown for “To Maneuver.” 
As depicted in OV-5, the GCV needs to complete a series of operational activities 
in order to achieve mission success. Thus, it is important for this author to ensure that 
GCV’s system functions are able to perform the identified operational activities. This 
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thesis achieves this by using the SV-5 (see Table 3), which maps operational activities to 
the GCV system functions (from the SV-4). 
Table 3.   SV-5 for GCV. 
 
 
G. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES 
This section identifies and discusses the potential susceptibility reduction 
techniques and technologies that one can use to counter the threats that the threat analysis 
phase identified. Chapter VII discusses the threats as well as the potential alternatives to 
counter the threats. 
H. MODELING AND SIMULATION 
This section seeks to propose a model to quantify the various survivability 
characteristics of a ground combat vehicle taking into account both vulnerability and 
susceptibility reduction. It also demonstrates the use of a well-established decision-
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making methodology to address the various trade-offs in capabilities. Chapter VIII 




VII. THREAT ANALYSIS AND SUSCEPTIBILITY REDUCTION  
Military planners expect a modern army to fight across a full spectrum of 
operations, ranging from low-intensity operations such as peacekeeping, to high-intensity 
operations against irregular and regular forces. Figure 19 illustrates the varying demands 
that different operations place on a GCV, with respect to the type and severity of the 
threats. Ball (2003) classifies the threats to a GCV into conventional and unconventional 
threats. According to Ball, engineers design conventional threats to attack relatively small 
targets, and they are not capable of causing destruction on a large scale (2003). Examples 
include guns, rockets, missiles and directed energy weapons. On the other hand, Ball 
explains that engineers design unconventional threats to function as weapons of mass 
destruction, which include nuclear, chemical and biological (NBC) weapons (2003). As 
the survivability requirements for conventional and unconventional threats are distinctly 
different, this thesis focuses only on conventional threats. 
 
Figure 19.  How Threat Severity Changes with Different Threat Scenarios. 
Source: Kempinski and Murphy (2012). 
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GCVs operating in urban environment face a multitude of threats, regardless of 
whether it is a low-intensity or high-intensity conflict. As the recent Middle East conflicts 
amply demonstrate, a skilled and determined enemy can utilize even obsolete weapons to 
great effect against advanced ground combat vehicles, especially in the confines of an 
urban environment. Since vulnerability reduction alone is no longer able to guarantee a 
reasonable level of survivability, this author believes that it is critical for military 
planners and engineers to explore alternative means of enhancing GCV survivability. 
Based on the survivability onion, this author believes that the only means to significantly 
improve GCV survivability is to leverage susceptibility reduction techniques, in addition 
to the existing vulnerability reduction techniques (i.e., designers and military planners 
need to embrace the survivability onion in its totality). The Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency’s (DARPA) Ground X-Vehicle technology program (see Figure 20) 
amply illustrates the critical need to consider susceptibility reduction to counter future 
threats and threat scenarios. This author has been working on armored fighting vehicle 
programs since 2008, particularly in the area of threats and survivability. Therefore, this 
chapter uses contents from external sources, as well as from this author’s previous work 
experiences. 
 
Figure 20.  Illustration of DARPA’s Ground X-Vehicle Program. Source: 
Lamothe (2014). 
As per the modified systems engineering Waterfall process model, this thesis first 
identifies and analyzes the characteristics of the key threats encountered by ground 
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vehicles during urban operations. After which, this thesis identifies and discusses the 
appropriate susceptibility reduction techniques that one can use to counter the threats. 
The six main susceptibility reduction techniques are (1) threat warning and situational 
awareness, (2) threat suppression, (3) signature management, (4) expendables, (5) noise 
jamming and deception and (6) tactics and performance. Finally, this thesis explores and 
discusses the potential technologies that can fulfil the susceptibility reduction 
requirements. 
A. ROCKETS 
As recent conflicts amply demonstrate, rockets are often the weapon-of-choice for 
urban engagements. This section provides a threat analysis on rockets and discusses the 
various susceptibility reduction techniques and technologies that one can use to counter 
rockets in an urban environment.  
1. Threat Analysis  
Rockets are short-range, unguided, fire-and-forget anti-armor weapons. Even 
though the precision and lethality of rockets are inferior compared to guided weapons, 
rockets are usually the weapon of choice for urban engagements. Based on this author’s 
experience, the key reasons include: 
1. Urban engagements are typically short to medium range (tens of meters to 
a few hundred meters). These ranges are well within the typical effective 
engagement ranges of rockets (about 200m to 300 m). 
2. Rockets have short arming distances (about 15 m for a RPG-7), which 
allows an enemy to fire rockets very near to a friendly vehicle. 
3. Rockets are generally smaller and lighter compared to missiles, which 
make it easier for a rocket carrying enemy to hide and to move around in 
an urban environment. 
4. Rockets require minimal preparation to launch, unlike missiles that require 
an operator to set up the launcher and sensors. Thus, an enemy can simply 
pop up, fire a rocket, displace to another location and repeat the process. 
5. Urban environment allows adversaries to target rockets at the weak spots 
of GCVs (sides, top and back), which are penetrable even by the smaller 
warheads on rockets. 
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6. Rockets are inherently cheaper to manufacture and therefore, much more 
readily available than missiles. Therefore, it is not surprisingly that 
insurgents and irregular forces favor rockets, especially the ubiquitous 
RPG-7. 
Despite their relatively small size compared to missiles, military planners regard 
rockets as serious threats to GCVs because of their shaped charge warheads, similar to 
those found on the heavier missiles. Based on this author’s experience, a shaped charge 
warhead typically consists of a concave metallic liner (usually copper), backed by high 
explosive. Upon detonation of the high explosive, the shockwave from the detonation 
compresses and squeezes the metallic liner into a long, thin jet, which can travel as fast as 
10 km/s. The jet is very efficient at penetrating monolithic armored steel as long as the jet 
forms properly and maintains a coherent stream. Figure 21 shows a shaped charge 
warhead on an RPG-7, and Figure 22 shows how the jet formation of a shaped charge 
warhead varies with the cone angle. From Figure 22, one can see that as the cone angle 
increases, the jet eventually becomes a metallic slug known as an explosively formed 
penetrator (EFP), which is particularly deadly as an improvised explosive device. 
Kempinski and Murphy estimates that the penetration performance of modern shaped 
charge warheads is about “11 to 12 times the cone diameter.” (2012, 49) This means that 
even for small (e.g., 40mm cone diameter) rockets, such rockets can already penetrate up 
to 480mm of armored steel. In addition to the effective shaped charge warheads, 
engineers typically design rockets to fly at velocities of around 200 m/s, meaning that for 
close-range engagements in an urban environment, it is highly unlikely for rockets to 
miss their target. Table 4 shows the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command’s 
(TRADOC) estimates of the probability that a basic RPG-7 rocket can hit a fully exposed 
tank at various ranges. One can see that at close ranges of less than 100 m (a typical 
engagement distance for urban operations), the probability of hit is almost 100%.  
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Figure 21.  Cross-Section of RPG-7 Showing Shaped-Charge Warhead. Source: 
Kempinski and Murphy (2012). 
 
Figure 22.  Effect of Cone Angle on Jet Formation. Source: Kempinski and 
Murphy (2012). 
Table 4.   Probability of Hit for an RPG-7 at Various Ranges. Adapted from U.S. 
Army TRADOC (1976). 
Range Probability of Hit 
50 m 100% 
100 m 92% 
200 m 55% 
300 m 25% 
400 m 15% 
 
Although engineers can use well-established solutions such as ERA or advanced 
composite armor to counter rockets with shaped charge warheads, these solutions incur 
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significant weight penalties on a ground vehicle, despite continuous advancements in 
materials technology. In order to minimize the weight penalty on vehicles, military 
planners and engineers optimize the solutions to provide the highest level of protection 
from the most likely direction of attack. Since an enemy can attack a vehicle from any 
direction in an urban environment, it is clear that optimizing protection to a certain sector 
of a ground vehicle is not a viable solution. Figure 23 shows an insurgent popping up to 
fire a rocket from the roof of a building at a tank in the streets below, with the tank 
promptly destroyed by the rocket. Defense companies are also designing rockets to attack 
vehicles specifically at their weakest spot (such as the NLAW rocket from Saab), which 
is usually the top. It is difficult for one to attack ground vehicles from the top in 
conventional ground operations and therefore, military planners generally did not require 
engineers to up-armor the roofs of ground combat vehicles. With companies developing 
rockets such as the NLAW, it is now important for military planners and engineers to 
protect the roofs of ground vehicles as well. 
 
Figure 23.  Insurgent Destroying a Tank from a Roof. Source: YouTube (2013). 
2. Susceptibility Reduction  
a. Threat Suppression 
This author believes that threat suppression is the key susceptibility reduction 
technique to counter rockets. Unlike guided weapons, rockets do not possess any 
sophisticated sensors and electronics that make them vulnerable against noise jamming 
and deception. In addition, due to the close engagement distances, there is very little time 
for a vehicle to react to a rocket attack in an urban environment. Thus, this author thinks 
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that the only effective way to defend against rocket attacks in an urban environment is to 
use a hard-kill APS to intercept the rocket. .  
According to Dieter and Wagner, a hard-kill APS consists of three main 
components, namely (1) sensors, (2) central processor and (3) countermeasures and the 
operating mode of the hard-kill APS typically consists of: 
1. Detection, analysis and classification of incoming threat 
2. Tracking of threat, estimate of threat hit point and decision whether to 
engage threat 
3. Calculation of engagement profile and selection of appropriate 
countermeasure unit 
4. Deployment of the selected countermeasure to degrade or destroy the 
incoming threat at the designated interception point (IP) (2009) 
Figure 24 illustrates the operating sequence for a typical hard-kill APS. A hard-
kill APS typically comprises multiple sensors to provide full 360° coverage in azimuth 
and at least 90° coverage in elevation (this can be likened to a dome covering a vehicle). 
The sensors (usually radar) detect and track the incoming threat and feedback the threat 
information (dimensions, velocity and flight path) to the central processor. The central 
processor then classifies the threat (missile, rocket or KE penetrator) and determines if 
the threat will hit the platform. If the central processor determines that the threat will miss 
the platform, no threat engagement will occur to preserve the limited quantity of 
countermeasures onboard. If the central processor determines that the threat will hit the 
platform, the central processor proceeds to calculate the engagement profile and selects 
the appropriate countermeasure to maximize the probability of intercepting the threat. 
Once ready, the central processor deploys the countermeasure(s) to degrade or destroy 
the incoming threat. According to Dieter and Wagner (2009), engineers typically utilize 
blast, fragmentation, “focused energy” or multiple explosively formed penetrators 
(MEFPs) as the damage mechanisms in the countermeasures. 
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Figure 24.  Typical Operational Sequence for a Hard-Kill APS. Source: Dieter and 
Wagner (2009). 
According to Dieter and Wagner, one can differentiate hard-kill APS by their 
system reaction time (SRT), which refers to the total amount of time that the system 
requires to detect, identify and recognize an incoming threat, launch countermeasures and 
to intercept and destroy the incoming threat (2009). Table 5 shows how one can classify a 
hard-kill APS today, either as a microsecond system or as a millisecond system. Table 5 
also shows that comparatively, a soft-kill APS has significantly longer SRT (measured in 
terms of seconds) compared to a hard-kill APS, which means that a soft-kill APS has 
limited effectiveness in an urban environment.  
Table 5.   SRT Classification for APS. Source: Dieter and Wagner (2009). 
APS Category SRT SRT Classification 
Hard Kill less than 1000 µs Microsecond System between 1 ms to 1000 ms Millisecond System 
Soft Kill greater than 1 s Second System 
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Besides the SRT, one can also differentiate hard-kill APS by their interception 
point (IP). Dieter and Wagner describe IP as the distance from the platform at which the 
countermeasure intercepts the incoming threat (2009). Table 6 shows the typical IPs that 
engineers use for hard-kill APS today. While operators will likely prefer the hard-kill 
APS to intercept an incoming threat as far away from the vehicle as possible, this author 
thinks that this likely requires the hard-kill APS to launch a physical projectile carrying 
the damage mechanism at the threat, which increases the overall SRT due to projectile 
flight time. Conversely, military planners can choose to intercept an incoming threat near 
to the platform, which allows engineers to use “focused energy” and MEFP 
countermeasures that travel significantly faster toward the incoming threat (based on this 
author’s experience, MEFPs can travel up to 2,000m/s). Threat interception near the 
vehicle minimizes any countermeasure flight time and reduces the overall SRT, but 
increases the probability that the residual products of the interception hit the vehicle. In 
this author’s opinion, another concern for intercepting threats far away is potential 
collateral damage against innocent civilians and property, especially in an urban 
environment. On the other hand, intercepting an incoming threat near to the platform 
contains the effects of the interception to within the immediate vicinity of the platform 
and thus, confines any collateral damage to a small area.  
Table 6.   IP Classification for Hard-Kill APS. 
Source: Dieter and Wagner (2009). 
 Interception Point (IP) Classification Distance between IP and 
platform 
1 Close-Range less than 2 m 
2 Medium-Range 2 m to 30 m 
3 Far-Range greater than 30 m 
 
Engineers commonly use minimum defeat distance (MDD) as the key 
performance parameter for hard-kill APS. Dieter and Wagner refer to MDD as the 
distance within which the hard-kill APS is unable to react fast enough to counter an 
incoming threat (also known as the “dead-zone” for the hard-kill APS) (2009). For 
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example, if the hard-kill APS has a MDD of 50 m, it cannot react to any threats that an 
enemy fires from within 50 m. According to Dieter and Wagner (2009), engineers can 
control MDD by defining the SRT and IP during system design (see equation for MDD). 
While it is not possible for one to control the incoming threat velocity, this author 




where MDD = minimum defeat distance 
SRT = system reaction time 
V = velocity of incoming threat 
IP = interception point 
Using the MDD equation, this author calculated the MDDs for different SRTs 
against rockets and missiles, assuming an IP of 5 m and typical velocities for rockets and 
missiles (see Table 7). Table 7 shows that microsecond SRT systems achieve MDD of 
less than 10 m, which in this author’s opinion, means that such systems can respond fast 
enough to deal with most of the expected threats in an urban environment. For 
millisecond SRT systems, the calculated MDD for missiles and rockets is at least 105 m, 
which in this author’s opinion, may be an issue in an urban environment. Based on this 
author’s experience, engineers design anti-tank rockets and missiles to have typical safe 
arming distances of less than 100 m (e.g., RPG-7 has an arming distance of only about 15 
m). Coupled with the close confines of an urban environment, adversaries can easily 
sneak up and attack ground vehicles from distances well within the MDD of some 




Table 7.   MDD for Different SRT Systems against Rockets and Missiles. 
  Minimum Defeat Distance (m) 
















200 205 105 5.2 5.1 
Anti-tank 
missile 
300 305 155 5.3 5.15 
 
TROPHY is the only known operationally fielded hard-kill APS today, and the 
IDF uses it on the Merkava IV MBT. According to the Zitun, TROPHY achieved its first 
operational success in March 2011 when it successfully intercepted an incoming RPG-29 
rocket (2012). During the 2014 Gaza conflict, military commentators reported that 
TROPHY made dozens of successful interceptions against advanced missiles such as the 
Kornet and Metis, as well as rockets such as the RPG-7 and RPG-29, resulting in zero 
hits to tanks equipped with the system. 
Dieter and Wagner (2009) classify TROPHY as a millisecond SRT system, with 
SRT of 300 to 350 ms and IP of 10 to 30 m. Figure 25 shows that TROPHY has four 
radars around the vehicle to provide a complete coverage dome around the vehicle. There 




Figure 25.  TROPHY on Merkava IV, showing Radar, Countermeasure and Auto-
Reloader. Source: Rafael (2010). 
This author believes that the TROPHY system is relatively simple and consists of 
only a few components, which potentially reduces the integration effort required. In 
addition, having fewer components also reduces the logistics burden for the system (i.e., 
system reliability, installation, removal and maintenance time, spares), as well as reduces 
the vulnerable area of the TROPHY system. This author thinks that reducing the 
vulnerable area is very important as it reduces the probability that a hostile damage 
mechanism can hit and disable the TROPHY system. Nevertheless, the main trade-off for 
this kind of centralized architecture is the relatively long SRT of about 300–350 ms, 
which in this author’s opinion, is due to the fact that (1) the system needs to mechanically 
rotate the countermeasure to face the incoming threat and (2) the system needs to re-load 
the countermeasure mechanically after each shot.  
Besides TROPHY, other companies are also developing their own hard-kill APS. 
Examples include the IRON CURTAIN from Artis and the AMAP-ADS from 
Rheinmetall. This thesis highlights these two systems in particular because they are well-
developed (though not known to be operationally fielded) and more importantly, they 
utilize a distributed architecture, unlike the centralized architecture of TROPHY. 
Figure 26 shows the AMAP-ADS. One can see that unlike TROPHY, the AMAP-
ADS has multiple sensors and countermeasures arranged in a ring around the platform. 
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This author suggests that this ring-like distribution of sensors and countermeasures is the 
defining characteristic of distributed architecture systems. As there are no known rotating 
components on the system, each sensor and countermeasure has its own fixed field-of-
view/field-of-attack (Rheinmetall 2013). Another key difference between the AMAP-
ADS and TROPHY is the IP. Unlike TROPHY that has IP of 10 m to 30 m, engineers 
designed the AMAP-ADS to intercept a threat 2 m from the platform (Rheinmetall 2013). 
In addition to a short IP, engineers also designed some systems such as the IRON 
CURTAIN to intercept a threat from the top, using “directed energy” instead of explosive 
projectiles. From Figure 27, one can see that these design decisions help direct most of 
the energy and collateral damage from the threat interception downwards and in the 
immediate vicinity of the platform, thus helping to minimize collateral damage. 
Nevertheless, from Figure 27, one can also easily visualize the potential risks to the crew 
sitting inside the vehicle when IRON CURTAIN intercepts a threat so close to the 
vehicle. 
 




Figure 27.  Downwards Interception of a Threat by IRON CURTAIN. Source: 
Rutherford (2009). 
This author believes that the key advantage of a distributed architecture is the 
very fast SRT. According to Rheinmetall (2013), the AMAP-ADS has SRT in the region 
of about 600 µs, which is 500 times faster than TROPHY’s SRT of about 300 ms. The 
IRON CURTAIN has a similar design architecture to the AMAPS-ADS, and this author 
expects it to have a similar SRT to the AMAP-ADS. This author attributes the fast SRT 
of a microsecond APS to the distributed architecture, whereby all the sensors and 
countermeasures have fixed sectors, meaning that there is no need for any mechanical 
movement (unlike TROPHY that requires mechanical steering and reloading of 
countermeasures). In addition, one can see from the MDD equation that having a short IP 
directly reduces the MDD for a hard-kill APS. Microsecond SRT systems have very short 
MDD (ideal for urban operations), which is almost independent of the incoming threat 
velocity (see Table 7). As such, this author believes that a distributed architecture hard-
kill APS is likely to have a higher potential of defeating high-velocity threats such as 
kinetic energy penetrators, compared to a centralized architecture system. 
Although a distributed architecture system has very fast SRT and very short 
MDD, it is not without trade-offs. One key disadvantage is the distribution of multiple 
sensors and countermeasures around the vehicle to provide full and overlapping 
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coverage. If one compares Figures 25 and 26, it is evident that a distributed architecture 
system like the AMAP-ADS has more than 30 components, compared to only about 10 
for a centralized architecture system like the TROPHY. This means that the distributed 
architecture system is likely more expensive than a centralized architecture system. The 
large quantity of components with their corresponding wires and connection points also 
means that it can be more difficult for engineers to integrate distributed architecture 
systems onto vehicles and this also results in a heavier logistics burden downstream (i.e., 
system reliability, installation, removal and maintenance time, spares). Due to the large 
quantity of components distributed around the ground vehicle, this author also thinks that 
the overall vulnerable area of a distributed architecture system is significantly greater 
than a centralized architecture system. This increases the probability that a hostile 
damage mechanism can hit and disable a hard-kill APS that uses distributed architecture. 
Finally, while engineers can design microsecond hard-kill APS to minimize collateral 
damage by intercepting the threats close to the vehicle, this can result in a higher 
probability of residual penetration (due to the remnants from the interception), especially 
from kinetic energy penetrators. 
B. MISSILES AND SMART BOMBS 
Recent conflicts generally pitted ill-equipped insurgent forces against 
technologically and numerically superior regular forces. As such, it is not surprising that 
advanced weapons such as missiles and smart bombs are not as prevalent in the recent 
conflicts compared to rockets. Nevertheless, future urban conflicts can involve near-peer 
forces, and one can expect extensive use of missiles and smart bombs in those conflicts. 
As such, this section provides a threat analysis on missiles and rockets and discusses the 
various susceptibility techniques and technologies that one can use to counter them.  
1. Threat Analysis 
Besides rockets, hostile forces can also attack GCVs by using a variety of guided 
weapons such as missiles and smart bombs. Due to the presence of guidance and tracking 
mechanisms on such weapons, their inherent accuracy is much greater than ballistic 
projectiles such as rockets. In addition to their higher accuracy, based on this author’s 
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experience, guided weapons typically have higher velocities (typically 300–400 m/s for 
missiles vis-a-vis about 250 m/s for rockets), longer engagement distances (a few 
kilometers for missiles vs less than one kilometer for rockets) and more lethal warheads 
compared to rockets. Based on this author’s experience, these advantages allow one to 
fire guided weapons outside the typical effective weapon engagement ranges for GCVs 
(about 1.5 km for IFV cannon and about 3 km for MBT main gun), which makes it 
difficult for GCVs to engage and suppress potential threats before they deploy their 
guided weapons.  
An operator must first detect a target and determine the target location before 
launching a missile or smart bomb at the target. The operator can obtain this information 
from sensors on-board surveillance aircraft/drone or from a forward observer on the 
ground. When the missile or smart bomb is sufficiently close to the target (terminal phase 
of the engagement), the weapon utilizes its onboard seekers to home in on the target, 
usually either via the infrared (IR) radiation generated by the target or via laser or radio-
frequency (RF) waves reflected from the target. Based on this author’s experience, 
engineers can implement three main types of seekers on guided weapons, namely (1) 
active homing seekers, (2) semi-active homing seekers and (3) passive homing seekers. 
Based on this author’s experiences, missiles can employ all three seeker types, while 
smart bombs typically employ semi-active homing seekers and passive homing seekers. 
Based on this author’s experience, active homing missiles typically rely on Radio 
Frequency (RF) waves to home in on a target. The missile carries an onboard transmitter 
to generate and transmit the RF waves, which reflect off a target. The receiver on the 
missile then detects the reflected RF waves, which allows the missile to determine the 
target location and to correct its flight path to intercept the target. This author believes 
that a key advantage of active homing missiles is their fire-and-forget capability, which 
allows the shooting platform to escape immediately after launching the missile, or to 
engage another target. Based on this author’s experience, engineers currently design 
active homing missiles primarily for the air-domain and the ship-domain, and there are no 
known active homing missiles designed to engage GCVs specifically. In this author’s 
opinion, this is probably because of the high cost for engineers to integrate RF 
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transceivers (which are expended every time one launches the missiles) on the missiles, 
vis-a-vis the cost of a GCV (compared to a much more expensive aircraft or ship). Thus, 
engineers typically use semi-active homing seekers or passive homing seekers on anti-
GCV missiles.  
Based on this author’s experience, the key difference between active homing and 
semi-active homing is that for the latter, the transmitter is on an external source and not 
onboard the missile itself. The external source transmits the energy, and the receiver on a 
semi-active homing missile detects the reflected energy (see Figure 28). The external 
source can be a radar onboard an airborne platform (e.g., the millimeter wave radar on the 
Apache attack helicopter) or a forward ground observer using a laser designator. The 
external source needs to illuminate the target constantly to guide the missile to the target 
and thus, semi-active homing missiles do not have a fire-and-forget capability. Examples 
of semi-active homing missiles include the AGM-114L HELLFIRE (using millimeter 
wave radar) and the LAHAT (using laser).  
 
Figure 28.  Semi-Active Homing Concept. Source: Hartman and Griffin (2007). 
Based on this author’s experience, a key disadvantage of active and semi-active 
homing missiles is that they rely on reflected energies to home in on the target. If the 
target has appropriate sensors to detect the incident energies, the sensors can provide the 
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target with early warning of impending attack and can potentially reveal the location of 
the hostile threat. Passive homing missiles can circumvent this disadvantage as they do 
not require any external source of illumination of the target. Engineers design passive 
homing missiles to detect and track the electromagnetic (EM) radiation that targets emit. 
Since all bodies or gases above absolute zero temperature emit EM radiation, IR seekers 
can pick out targets as long as there is sufficient temperature difference between the 
target and the environment. Another added advantage of passive homing missiles is the 
fire-and-forget capability. Once the missile locks on to the target’s IR signature, it can 
independently track and guide itself to the target. An example is the U.S. Army’s Javelin 
missile, which uses an imaging IR seeker to track and destroy a target without any 
additional guidance from the gunner.  
Besides homing missiles, adversaries can also use command line of sight (CLOS) 
missiles to attack GCVs. Based on this author’s experience, CLOS missiles are more 
prevalent in ground operations compared to homing missiles. For CLOS missiles, a 
gunner needs to guide the missile optically to the target, which necessitates that the 
gunner keeps the optical sight on the target until impact. Thus, CLOS missiles also lack 
fire-and-forget capability. CLOS missile systems typically have a sighting device on the 
launcher, which calculates the angular difference between the missile flight path and the 
target and generates command signals to minimize the angular difference. CLOS missile 
systems usually transmit the command signals to the missile via wires trailing behind the 
missile or via RF signals. See Figure 29 for an illustration of CLOS guidance. Since 
CLOS missiles rely on optical guidance, the target will not have early warning of attack, 
similar to passive homing missiles. Nevertheless, one can expect CLOS missiles to be 
less complex and cheaper compared to homing missiles, but with trade-offs in accuracy 
(due to human tracking error involved) and range (due to the length of wire required). An 
example of a CLOS missile is the U.S. Army’s Tube-Launched, Optically-Guided, Wire-
Tracked (TOW) missile. 
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Figure 29.  Command Line of Sight Guidance. Source: Army-Technology (2016). 
Besides missiles, smart bombs also utilize similar principles to home in on their 
targets. One example is the Paveway series of laser-guided bombs that the U.S. military 
uses for precision strikes. These bombs have a semi-active laser seeker that detects 
reflected laser energy from a target and homes in on the target using the reflected laser 
energy. Another example is the CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed weapon (SFW), which is a 1,000 
pound guided Cluster Bomb Unit (CBU). According to Defencyclopedia (2015), the 
SFW contains 40 projectiles or “skeets.” The “skeets” rely on passive homing IR seekers 
to detect the thermal signatures of ground vehicles before engaging them by firing EFPs 
through their roofs. Considering the lethality of EFPs, the thin roof armor of most GCVs 
and the number of “skeets” per CBU-105, it is certainly possible for an adversary to 
degrade or destroy an entire column of GCVs by using just a few CBU-105 units. 
Currently, only select nations can afford advanced weapons such as laser-guided bombs 
and the CBU-105, but it is conceivable for engineers or even technologically savvy 
insurgents to integrate the technologies in such weapons (such as the sensor) into “cheap” 
weapons (e.g., rockets and mortars) in the future and use them as precision swarm 
weapons. 
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2. Susceptibility Reduction  
Missiles and smart bombs have higher inherent accuracies and kill probabilities 
compared to rockets due to their complex targeting and guidance mechanisms. 
Nevertheless, this author believes that having such capabilities also makes it easier for 
one to defeat guided weapons. Compared to unguided rockets that have no complex 
targeting and guidance mechanisms, one can use more susceptibility reduction techniques 
to defeat missiles and smart bombs, which include threat warning and situational 
awareness, signature reduction, expendables, threat suppression and noise jamming and 
deception.  
a. Threat Warning and Situational Awareness 
Based on this author’s experience, most GCVs today lack an integrated defensive 
aid system (DAS) to warn the crew of potential incoming attacks, and to generate 
automatically a response to minimize the probability of engagement or probability of hit. 
Anti-GCV missiles and smart bombs today predominantly rely on semi-active homing 
guidance, and laser is the most common method to guide a weapon onto the target. Thus, 
this author thinks that it is critical for military planners and engineers to equip GCVs with 
early warning systems to detect hostile “lasing,” so that the GCV can take appropriate 
counter-measures to improve survivability. Figure 30 shows that a DAS composes of 
three main components, namely (1) sensor, (2) central processor and (3) 
countermeasures. The sensor provides warning of potential threat as well threat location. 
The DAS processor processes the threat information and displays it to the crew via the 
man-machine interface. In addition, the DAS processor also sends the threat information 
to the battlefield management system to alert other friendly forces, which permits 
subsequent prosecution of the target. Finally, depending on the settings, the DAS 
processor can also automatically deploy the necessary countermeasures to minimize the 
probability of engagement and hit.  
 73 
 
Figure 30.  Basic Concept of a DAS. Source: Fournier (2012). 
Against laser designators, engineers typically use a laser warning device (LWD) 
to provide early warning of hostile “lasing.” An example of this is the Goodrich AN/
AVR-2, which receives, processes and displays threat information resulting from 
illumination by laser designators and laser rangefinders from all directions. As the sensor 
is capable of detecting the direction of the laser source, this author believes that engineers 
should integrate the information into a ground vehicle’s weapon system. Upon threat 
detection, engineers can program the sensor to slew a weapon or jammer to the 
approximate location of the threat and attempt to disrupt the laser designation process 
(threat suppression). The DAS can also cue the deployment of expendables such as 
smoke and aerosols to mask the ground vehicle from the hostile laser energy. These 
actions can increase the probability of the missile missing the target. 
b. Signature Reduction 
An operator needs to detect and locate a target first before the operator can launch 
a guided weapon at the target. One can detect a GCV by using different sensors such as 
optical, radar, electro-optic or infrared. Therefore, signature reduction seeks to negate the 
effectiveness of these sensors in detecting the GCVs. Even if the sensors manage to 
detect and engage a GCV, signature reduction helps to reduce the ability of the missiles 
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and smart bombs to home in on the GCV and therefore, increase the probability of miss. 
This author believes that signature reduction is an important countermeasure against 
attacks by swarms of “cheap” smart weapons in the future. Once an enemy deploys such 
swarm weapons (e.g., smart bomblets), it is not feasible or possible for the GCV to shoot 
down all of the weapons. Thus, signature reduction plays a significant role in reducing 
the probability that such weapons can detect, engage or hit the ground vehicle. Based on 
this author’s experience, signature reduction in the thermal region is particularly 
important for ground vehicles as passive homing weapons predominantly use IR 
guidance. While radar-guided weapons are not as prevalent as IR guided weapons 
currently, many airborne sensors use radar (such as synthetic aperture radar) to detect 
ground vehicles. In addition, this author believes that the main reasons for the current 
lack of radar-guided weapons against GCVs are cost and the signal clutter when 
operating radars in a ground environment, particularly in urban settings. As radar 
technology continues to evolve, this author expects the cost-effectiveness and 
performance of radar-guided missiles in ground urban operations to improve and 
therefore, it may become feasible for militaries to employ such missiles against GCVs 
extensively in the near future.  
ADAPTIV from BAE Systems is a unique active camouflage system that can 
mask the thermal signature of ground vehicles. According to Eshel, ADAPTIV makes use 
of modules that can individually cool down or heat up to create different thermal patterns 
(2011b). This allows ADAPTIV to mimic the surrounding temperature and thus, reduce 
the thermal contrast between the vehicle and its surroundings. As IR seekers require 
thermal contrast to detect targets, decreasing thermal contrast reduces the probability that 
an IR sensor or missile can detect, engage or hit a ground vehicle. Eshel (2011b) also 
mentions that the ADAPTIV system can create specific thermal signatures that military 
planners can use for vehicle identification, which reduces the chance of friendly fire 
(fratricide) and indirectly improves the survivability of a ground vehicle. Figure 31 shows 
the ADAPTIV system and illustrates its capability to blend in with the surrounding, as 
well as mimic different vehicle thermal signatures. 
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Figure 31.  ADAPTIV Thermal Camouflage System. Source: Eshel (2011b). 
While the ADAPTIV system has significant potential in the area of thermal 
signature management, this author believes that there are trade-offs. These include the 
need for engineers to provision additional power to operate the system, the additional 
costs that military planners incur to maintain the system (especially in ground urban 
operations) and the potential difficulties that engineers face to integrate ADAPTIV with 
vehicular passive armor. There are other operationally available solutions on the market 
today that can provide passive reduction in thermal signatures. A well-known example is 
the Barracuda Mobile Camouflage System (MCS) from the Swedish company Saab, 
which is an operationally proven system (see Figure 32). In this author’s opinions, the 
key advantages of a “net” system such as the MCS over ADAPTIV include lower life-
cycle cost, no power requirement from the vehicle as well as the ability to reduce the 
internal temperature of the vehicle, which is critical especially in hot climates. 
Nevertheless, this author expects active systems such as ADAPTIV to provide better 
signature reduction performance against IR sensors, as active systems seek to mask a 
vehicle’s thermal signature, unlike a passive system, which merely seeks to reduce a 
vehicle’s thermal signature. 
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Figure 32.  Barracuda MCS. Source: Saab (2014). 
Besides reducing thermal signature, this author thinks that it is also important for 
military planners and engineers to reduce vehicular radar signature as well. This is 
because radar technology and cost-effectiveness will continue to improve, and it will be 
viable for militaries to employ radar-guided missiles against GCVs in the future. In 
February 2016, researchers at the Raytheon-UMass Lowell Research Institute (RURI) 
developed a novel ink technology. According to Raytheon (2016), this technology is a 
special ferroelectric nano-ink that can generate different electromagnetic frequencies 
depending on the voltage that one applies to the ink. In addition, one can also spray or 
“print” the ink onto any surface using an aerosol jet, which can then function as radio 
antennas or radar arrays (see Figure 33). In this author’s opinion, a key military 
application for this new ink is its potential to revolutionize how engineers can protect 
platforms against radar. According to Majumdar, engineers optimize stealth technology 
today to defeat high-frequency radars and not low-frequency radars, which is because 
low-frequency radars are currently not good at discerning targets, especially in a cluttered 
environment (2014). Nevertheless, Majumdar cautions that this situation will change 
eventually as radar and processing technology improves, which can allow even low-
frequency radars to accurately and precisely discern targets (2014). This poses a clear 
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threat to the existing stealth technology, which engineers optimize to defeat high-
frequency radar. 
 
Figure 33.  An Aerosol Jet Applying Electric Ink at the RURI. 
Source: Raytheon (2016). 
In this author’s opinion, the new printable ink technology is a potential solution to 
the issue of high-performance, low-frequency radars. As one can tune the ink’s 
electromagnetic frequency by varying the amount of voltage that one applies to the ink, 
the ink can potentially generate a wide spectrum of radar frequencies. Depending on the 
frequency of the hostile radar, one can tune the ink to generate an appropriate counter-
frequency to negate the hostile radar wave through destructive interference. Therefore, 
the tunable ink can reduce the amount of reflected EM energy that the hostile radar 
receives, which reduces the probability that the hostile radar detects the protected 
platform. In other words, the new ink technology can potentially create an “invisibility 
cloak” around the protected platform that significantly reduces the radar signature of the 
platform against both low-frequency and high-frequency radars. In addition, since one 
can print the ink onto any surface, engineers will not need to cater excessive space for the 
printed radar antennae, which facilitates integration of the printed radar antennae onto 
compact platforms such as a ground combat vehicle.  
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Besides reducing thermal and radar signatures, this author thinks that it is also 
important for military planners and engineers to reduce a GCV’s signature to laser 
designators. One can achieve this by using special materials and paint to attenuate the 
amount of reflected laser energy. In 2010, a team from Yale University proposed an 
interesting concept known as Coherent Perfect Absorber (CPA) or “anti-laser,” and the 
team demonstrated a working prototype of the “anti-laser” in 2011. The anti-laser device 
consists of a specially designed optical cavity, which traps incident laser light and forces 
the light to bounce repeatedly within the optical cavity to dissipate the laser energy as 
heat. Results indicated that for a specific laser wavelength, the anti-laser device absorbed 
99.4% of the incident laser light (BBC 2011). If engineers can implement such a 
technology on ground vehicles, engineers can potentially reduce a GCV’s susceptibility 
to laser-based threats such as laser designators and laser rangefinders. 
Aircraft and ships are the primary military platforms today that incorporate 
significant amounts of signature reduction technologies. Based on this author’s 
experience, no military is currently fielding GCVs with significant signature reduction 
technologies in their design. Nevertheless, Poland and BAE Systems are attempting to 
buck the trend by jointly developing a prototype tank known as the PL-01 (see Figure 
34). The PL-01 attempts to minimize infrared signature by using the ADAPTIV system 
from BAE Systems. The PL-01 also attempts to reduce radar signature by adopting 
smooth contour shapes (GCVs today are typically “boxy” looking) that help minimize 
reflected radar energies. Engineers also reduced the number of potential radar scatter 
points on the PL-01. For example, engineers recessed the smoke grenade launchers at the 
vehicle rear, instead of mounting them outside the PL-01, like most ground vehicles 
today. These measures help to reduce the PL-01’s radar, thermal and visual signatures 




Figure 34.  Futuristic PL-01 Concept Tank. Source: Military-Today (2016). 
c. Expendables 
One major component of a DAS is the countermeasure suite to reduce the 
probability that an incoming threat hits the vehicle. In air combat, fighter pilots typically 
expend onboard chaff or flares to deceive hostile seekers for a limited period while they 
maneuver away from the seeker-tracking window. Engineers also use this method to 
defend ground vehicles against laser and IR guided weapons. Smoke and aerosols are 
generally quite effective against such weapons. Based on this author’s experience, smoke 
and aerosols typically consist of a cloud of small particles. When an electromagnetic 
wave (laser in this case) strikes the cloud, the cloud can absorb, scatter and/or transmit 
the laser energy. The main purpose of the cloud of particles is to scatter and attenuate the 
laser energy, to minimize the amount of laser energy that the ground vehicle reflects back 
to the hostile receiver. Without receiving a sufficient return signal, the hostile threat is 
unable to detect, engage or hit the ground vehicle. The ability of smoke and aerosols to 
scatter and attenuate laser energy depends on the type of particles and the particle size, 
vis-a-vis the expected laser wavelength. Therefore, it is important for engineers to 
optimize smoke and aerosols systems for the expected laser wavelengths. Based on this 
author’s experience, multispectral smoke is increasingly popular today because they are 
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effective against electromagnetic radiation with frequencies ranging from about 1µm to 
10µm. This is because battlefield laser rangefinders and designators typically operate 
around the 1µm band, while thermal imagers and seekers typically operate in the 3µm to 
5µm band, or the 8µm to 12µm band.  
d. Noise Jamming and Deception 
Missiles and smart bombs are susceptible to noise jamming and deception as one 
can attempt to interfere with the electronics inside these guided weapons, which increases 
the probability that the weapon misses the intended target. According to Ball, noise 
jamming seeks to overwhelm a seeker by generating large numbers of false targets and 
hiding the true target among the false targets, while deception seeks to “seduce” a hostile 
seeker away from the intended target by presenting false target information to the hostile 
seeker (2003). An example is the AN/AAQ-24 system that seeks to protect fixed and 
rotary wing aircraft from IR missiles by jamming the missiles with a high-intensity laser. 
In this author’s opinion, engineers can adapt and integrate such jammers onto ground 
combat vehicles to reduce their susceptibility to IR missiles, and engineers can do so with 
a significantly lower weight penalty compared to passive armor. In addition, as long as 
the vehicle provides sufficient power to the jammer, the jammer can protect the vehicle 
from repeated attacks by IR missiles, unlike passive armor and hard-kill APS, which have 
limited multi-hit capability (due to structural integrity of the armor and limited 
ammunition for the hard-kill APS). The main disadvantage of jammers is that they are 
only effective against the specific threats which engineers designed the jammer to defeat. 
Using the AN/AAQ-24 as an example, it is only effective against IR guided missiles and 
not radar or laser-guided missiles. Jammers are also ineffective against ballistic 
projectiles that have no electronics for the jammers to act against. Since ground combat 
vehicles face ballistic threats and non-ballistic threats, this author believes that jammers 
by themselves cannot satisfy the survivability requirements of a ground vehicle, 
especially in an urban environment. 
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C. KINETIC ENERGY PENETRATORS 
Kinetic energy (KE) penetrators are not prevalent in recent conflicts for the same 
reasons as missiles and smart bombs. Nevertheless, one can expect widespread use of KE 
penetrators in any future ground conflicts that involve near-peer forces. As such, this 
section provides a threat analysis on KE penetrators and discusses the various 
susceptibility techniques and technologies that one can use to counter KE penetrators. 
1. Threat Analysis 
Military planners typically use KE penetrators, particularly the armor-piercing fin 
stabilized discarding sabot (APFSDS), to defeat heavily armored GCVs such as main 
battle tanks. KE penetrators like the APFSDS are efficient at penetrating heavy armor due 
to the penetrator mass (typically five to 10kg) and the penetrator velocity (up to 2,000 m/
s). Based on this author’s experience, the length to diameter or L/D ratio of a penetrator 
also has significant effect on the penetrating capability of a KE penetrator. In general, the 
larger the L/D ratio, the better the penetrating capability of the penetrator. This explains 
why modern APFSDS penetrators resemble medieval arrows. Therefore, in order to 
counter increasingly advanced composite armor, engineers typically try to increase 
penetrator mass, L/D ratio and/or penetrator velocity. 
The impact of a KE penetrator on armor generates behind-armor-debris (BAD) 
inside the vehicle. BAD comprises of both the fragments from spalling (ejection of 
material from the back face of the armor), as well as the remnants of the penetrator that 
perforates into the vehicle interior. BAD is the primary killing mechanism for KE 
penetrators, as the fragments can seriously injure or kill anybody behind the armor, as 
well as cause significant damage to equipment inside the vehicle. The most effective KE 
penetrators are APFSDS fired from large caliber guns, as large caliber guns generate the 
high muzzle velocities that penetrators require. Both MBTs and tank-destroyers use 
large-caliber, high-velocity guns. Based on this author’s experience, modern APFSDS 
penetrators have maximum effective range of about 3,000 m. Due to the high velocity of 
the penetrator, it takes the penetrator only about 2 s to hit the target, even at the 
maximum effective engagement range. In an urban environment, the typical engagement 
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distance is short and if a hostile threat fires an APFSDS penetrator at a ground vehicle, it 
is highly likely for the penetrator to hit and kill the ground vehicle. 
While APFSDS penetrators are very effective in penetrating heavy armor, they 
are not without disadvantages and constraints. In order to penetrate heavy armor, 
APFSDS penetrators need to travel at high velocities of up to 2,000 m/s. Only large- 
caliber, high-velocity guns such as those found on MBTs and tank destroyers can 
generate such high energies. Due to the confines of an urban environment, it is not easy 
for an adversary to hide MBTs and tank destroyers in the urban environment. In addition, 
due to the large size of the ammunition, MBTs and tank-destroyers can only carry a 
limited quantity of rounds (about 40 on average), which are usually a mix of High 
Explosive rounds (general purpose) and APFSDS (armor killing). Therefore, in order to 
destroy the maximum number of targets, MBTs and tank destroyers need to have a high 
first round hit probability. MBTs and tank destroyers achieve this by providing accurate 
target range data to the onboard fire control computer, which uses the range data (plus 
other information) to calculate the optimal ballistic solution for firing.  
2. Susceptibility Reduction 
This author thinks that military planners and engineers can employ susceptibility 
techniques such as threat suppression, threat warning and situational awareness, noise 
jamming and deception and expendables to reduce a GCV’s susceptibility against KE 
penetrators. MBTs and tank destroyers typically use laser rangefinders to obtain accurate 
target range data. Laser rangefinders use similar technology to laser designators, which 
this thesis had discussed in the previous section. Therefore, some of the techniques and 
technologies that one uses to counter laser designators can also apply to laser 
rangefinders. 
a. Threat Suppression 
It is difficult for an enemy to hide MBTs and tank destroyers in an urban 
environment. Thus, good intelligence and reconnaissance operations prior to an assault 
can determine the locations of some of these weapons. Military commanders can then use 
precision fires to destroy the threats before they can engage friendly forces. If military 
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commanders have air superiority, airborne assets and sensors can also provide persistent 
surveillance during the urban assault mission. Besides providing aerial surveillance, 
airborne platforms can also engage any hostile MBTs or tank destroyers that the enemy 
deploys against the friendly ground forces.  
If a hostile MBT or tank destroyer fires a KE penetrator at a ground vehicle, the 
vehicle has very little time to react to the incoming threat. Therefore, this author believes 
that a hard-kill APS provides the best chance of survival for the ground vehicle. This 
thesis discussed hard-kill APS in detail under the section on rockets, but there are 
differences between defeating a high-velocity KE penetrator and a much slower missile 
or rocket. As this author discussed previously, MDD is a crucial performance parameter 
for a hard-kill APS. This author used the MDD formula to calculate the MDD for 
different hard-kill APS systems against KE penetrators. Table 8 shows that hard-kill APS 
with fast SRT (microseconds) have generally no issues reacting to KE penetrators 
because of their relatively short MDD. For hard-kill APS with slower SRT 
(milliseconds), there can be instances whereby a hostile threat fires a KE penetrator from 
within their MDD (especially in urban environments), which essentially negates the 
effectiveness of the hard-kill APS. If one compared Tables 7 and 8, one can see that the 
MDD for microsecond SRT systems is largely independent of threat velocity (MDD 
increases slightly from 5 m to 27 m when threat velocity increases from 200 m/s to 2000 
m/s). On the other hand, one can also see that threat velocity greatly affects the MDD for 
millisecond SRT systems (MDD increases from 200m to 2,000 m when threat velocity 
increases from 200 m/s to 2,000 m/s).  
Table 8.   MDD for Different SRT Systems against KE Penetrators. 
 Minimum Defeat Distance (m) 
Threat 
velocity (m/s) 








500 µs reaction 
time system 
1,500 1,525 m 775 m 26.5 m 25.75 m 
2,000 2,025 m 1,025 m 27 m 26 m 
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Currently, there is no known operational hard-kill APS that can defeat KE 
penetrators. This is because rockets and missiles largely dominate the recent conflicts, 
particularly those in the Middle East. Therefore, it is not surprising that military planners 
and engineers steer the development of hard-kill APS toward defeating rockets and 
missiles. Nevertheless, the now-cancelled IRON FIST system from Israeli Military 
Industries (IMI) (see Figure 35) had the potential to defeat KE penetrators. According to 
IMI (2016), engineers designed the IRON FIST countermeasure to detonate as it passes 
by a KE penetrator. The radial blast from the detonation de-stabilizes the penetrator and 
causes it to either miss the target vehicle completely or to impact the target vehicle at a 
non-optimal angle (significantly reduces penetration power). This author mentioned 
previously that engineers can improve the penetrating capability of an APFSDS 
penetrator by increasing the L/D ratio. In this author’s opinion, this actually makes it 
easier for hard-kill APS such as the IRON FIST to defeat the penetrator as the larger the 
L/D ratio, the easier it is for a countermeasure to destabilize the penetrator in flight and 
cause the penetrator to tumble. 
 
Figure 35.  Iron Fist Interceptor Approaching a APFSDS. 
Source: Israeli Military Industries (2016). 
b. Threat Warning and Expendables 
MBTs and tank destroyers require accurate range data to achieve a high first 
round hit probability, and they usually rely on laser rangefinders to do this. This thesis 
had previously discussed about the threat warning and expendables techniques and 
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technologies that one can use to counter laser designators. One can employ the same 
techniques and technologies to counter laser rangefinders. 
c. Noise Jamming and Deception 
While ground vehicles can use expendables such as smoke and aerosols to defeat 
battlefield lasers, this author believes that smoke and aerosols are effective against laser 
designators but are not as effective against laser rangefinders. Based on this author’s 
experience, modern laser rangefinders usually only require a couple of pulses at most to 
accurately determine target range. Considering the fact that smoke and aerosol clouds 
require a few seconds to form completely (this duration can be longer due to 
environmental conditions, especially wind), vis-a-vis the time (measured in milliseconds) 
that the hostile laser signal requires to travel to the target and back to the receiver, the 
cloud is unlikely to attenuate the laser energy sufficiently to prevent the hostile MBT or 
tank destroyer from obtaining an accurate range reading. Therefore, this author believes 
that engineers need to explore other susceptibility reduction means such as noise 
jamming and deception to degrade hostile laser rangefinder performance. The “anti-laser” 
system that this author discussed previously is a potential solution to this issue. 
Besides using the “anti-laser” system, engineers can attempt to deceive a hostile 
laser rangefinder by transmitting a false laser echo back to the hostile receiver. This 
results in incorrect range information and in an incorrect ballistic solution, thus reducing 
the probability of hit. While there is research into such a spoofing system, there is little 
open source information available. Magnit Ltd claimed in 2006 that the Ukrainian Army 
is using a laser-spoofing system (known as the F-3 LRF Deceptor) developed by the 
company. According to Defense-Update (2006), the F-3 LRF Deceptor is effective 
against lasers with wavelength of 1.06 µm, can result in target miss distance of up to 400 
m and can increase target engagement time by as much as 15 to 20 s.  
Germany previously developed a simple laser deception system that does not 
contain any complex electronics, unlike a laser-spoofing device (Wei 2007). According 
to Wei, engineers placed multiple converging lenses around a vehicle, and used an optical 
fiber delay line to connect the lenses together (2007). Wei further explains that when 
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laser energy impinges on the vehicle, the lenses collect the laser energy and routes the 
laser energy through the optical fiber delay line and out through a reflector (2007). This 
process artificially changes the time for the laser energy to return to the hostile receiver, 
which results in incorrect range data. While this appears to be a simple and feasible 
concept, this author thinks that the fragility of the lenses can affect the robustness of the 
system in ground operations, which limits the actual operational utility of the system. 
Nevertheless, in this author’s opinion, one can circumvent the limitation by using 
multiple small lenses instead of a few large lenses, to minimize performance degradation 
due to lens damage (similar to the concept behind LED lamps), or by relying on 
technological advancements to improve the robustness of the lens. 
D. IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES  
Improvised explosive devices (IED) are among the most common weapon that 
insurgents used in recent conflicts. This is because insurgents know that engineers 
designed the existing ground combat vehicles to survive ballistic projectiles primarily and 
not underbody threats such as mines and IEDs. In fact, one can consider IEDs as being 
synonymous with asymmetric warfare. The IED threat was so severe in the recent 
conflicts that the U.S. Army invested US$45B to develop and build MRAP vehicles to 
protect troops, even though the vehicles had little utility as ground combat vehicles. Thus, 
it is important for one to understand IEDs and to be aware of the susceptibility reduction 
techniques and technologies that one can use to counter IEDs. 
1. Threat Analysis 
The relative ease of obtaining the required raw materials and setting up IEDs 
allowed insurgents and militants to employ them to devastating effects against 
technologically and numerically superior forces. According to Freudenrich, IEDs 




With the proliferation of arms from conventional sources, it is easy for insurgents 
to obtain high-energy explosives to make IEDs with significant blast effects. The blast 
effect is dependent on the type and quantity of explosive that one uses to make the IED. 
The primary killing mechanism in blast IEDs is the overpressure on a target that is near 
the point of detonation. The blast overpressure causes material strain due to the 
supersonic blast waves and the overpressure can propagate beyond the armor, which 
causes spalling within the interior of the vehicle. Besides causing spalling, the blast 
overpressure can also cause internal injuries to humans, such as failure of internal organs 
and traumatic brain injuries. While blast IEDs are dangerous, they are only effective if 
the intended targets are near to the point of detonation. This is because blast overpressure 
and energy decreases rapidly with distance from the point of detonation. 
b. Fragmentation 
Insurgents often create fragmentation IEDs by using existing artillery and mortar 
shells, whose design incorporates the fragmentation damage mechanism. Insurgents can 
also enhance the effects of fragmentation by including additional fragmentation-
generating objects such as nails, metal shavings or ball bearings inside the IED. Due to 
the mass and velocity of the individual fragments, it is not difficult for fragments to 
penetrate lightly armored regions of vehicles and body armor, to cause serious injuries or 
even death. Nevertheless, fragmentation IEDs are generally ineffective against more 
heavily armored vehicles. 
c. Penetration 
Insurgents create penetration IEDs by incorporating metal liners into the IEDs, 
which results in the formation of EFPs upon detonation. Based on this author’s 
experience, EFPs are relatively heavy and can travel over 2,000 m/s, meaning that they 
essentially function as KE penetrators. Unlike fragmentation and blast IEDs, EFPs are 
capable of traveling long distances and penetrating heavy armor. In addition, due to the 
relatively small amount of explosive charge required to form EFPs, it is easier for an 
insurgent to conceal an EFP IED, compared to blast and fragmentation IEDs. Therefore, 
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it is not surprisingly that military planners often regard EFP IEDs as the deadliest form of 
IED. 
2. Components of an IED 
Although IEDs differ in design depending on the intended target and the damage 
mechanism, they share a common set of components that include (1) initiating system, 
(2) casing, (3) power source and (4) the main charge (Department of Homeland Security 
2016). By examining the components of an IED and the chain of activities leading up to 
detonation, one can identify appropriate susceptibility reduction techniques.  
a. Initiating System  
The initiating system triggers detonation of an IED. A target can trigger an IED 
detonation by activating a tripwire or by stepping on the IED. Insurgents can also 
detonate an IED remotely, by using a simple hard wire or by using wireless means such 
as a RF signals or IR signals. 
b. Casing  
The purpose of the casing is to conceal the IED and to generate additional 
fragmentation effects. In the recent Middle East conflicts, insurgents have used a wide 
variety of innocuous looking objects such as cans, boxes, plastic bags and even animal 
carcasses to conceal IEDs.  
c. Power Source 
Most IEDs require an internal or external power source to trigger detonation. 
Batteries are the most common power source for IEDs, and battery sizes can range from 
small flashlight alkaline batteries to large car batteries (for detonation of vehicle borne 
IEDs). It is also possible for insurgents to power IEDs by linking them to the local power 
supply in a house or office. 
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d. Main Charge 
Insurgents generally prefer to use military-grade explosives as the main charge 
because these explosives are relatively easy to obtain (especially in a war-zone), are 
ready to use and have high detonation energies. Insurgents can also “daisy-chain” 
military explosives together (such as artillery shells) to take out even the heaviest 
vehicles like MBTs. Even if military explosives are not available, insurgents are often 
able to convert commercial products such as fertilizers into ammonium nitrate fuel oil 
(ANFO), which is a form of commercial high explosive.  
3. Susceptibility Reduction 
Due to the tight constraints with operating in an urban environment, many 
engagements are in close contact or proximity, and are often limited to line of sight 
engagements. This author thinks that one can use threat warning and situational 
awareness, noise jamming and deception and threat suppression to counter IEDs.  
a. Threat Warning and Situational Awareness 
In this author’s opinion, the first line of defense against IEDs is the ability of 
friendly forces to detect and understand any threat in the vicinity, as this allows one to 
take appropriate response to counter the IEDs before enemies can deploy them. As it is 
easy for an enemy to conceal IEDs, this author believes that engineers need to integrate 
different sensor technologies on a single platform to provide a high probability of 
detecting IEDs. While optical and radar sensors are prevalent in the field of IED 
detection, it is also important for engineers to leverage non-visual means such as atomic 
emission spectroscopy. This is because of the ease in concealing IEDs. According to 
Freudenrich, atomic emission spectroscopy can detect traces of explosive content within 
a 30 m radius (2008). The Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) is developing an integrated 
counter IED suite known as the Counter IED & Mine Suite (CIMS). According to Eshel 
(2014c), the CIMS fuses information collected from various sensor suites onboard the 
CIMS vehicle to enable operators to detect different types of threats both above and 
underground. The CIMS can also apply follow-on responses to neutralize any IED threats 
that will endanger friendly forces. The CIMS uses a variety of sensors, including 
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synthetic aperture radar (SAR), optical detection systems, ground penetrating radar and 
magnetic detectors, to detect accurately, recognize and map any IED threats. 
While integrated detection systems such as the CIMS can provide effective 
warning to friendly forces, this author believes that such systems only provide just-in-
time warning of potential IED threats. If one detects IEDs well in advance of the arrival 
of friendly forces, this further reduces the IED threat. One can achieve this by employing 
systems that provide persistent surveillance of the areas that friendly forces need to pass 
through. Analysts can then process the captured imageries and compare them with 
previous ones to detect anomalies or changes in the environment, which can indicate the 
presence of IEDs. Airborne systems such as the Persistent Threat Detection System from 
Lockheed Martin (see Figure 36) are the most suitable for such a role. Besides 
performing an anti-IED role through persistent surveillance, it is conceivable for military 
planners to use persistent airborne systems to perform other critical battlefield roles such 
as functioning as a centralized communications hub to integrate and disseminate 
information to friendly units in the area. This can help to mitigate the inherent 
communications problem in urban areas due to buildings and clutter, which enhances the 
overall situation awareness for friendly forces in the area. 
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Figure 36.  Persistent Surveillance System. Source: Lockheed Martin (2016). 
b. Noise Jamming and Deception 
As recent conflicts amply demonstrate, insurgents prefer to initiate an IED 
through remote means such as using a cell phone. It is relatively easy and cheap for 
insurgents to obtain such a wireless initiator, and cell phones allow insurgents to detonate 
IEDs in relative safety from a considerable distance away. While the ideal solution is for 
friendly forces to disable the IED at its source, either by removing the remote activation 
trigger (usually an insurgent with a cell phone) or by neutralizing the IED itself, it is 
often not possible for one to do so due to constraints such as the wide search area, time, 
resources and the relative ease of hiding an IED. As such, the next best solution is for one 
to prevent the insurgent from remotely detonating the IED. In order to achieve this, one 
can use area jammers that target several specific bands of wireless frequencies and 
attempt to saturate and overpower the frequencies to prevent detonation signals from 
reaching the remote trigger of the IED. U.S. and coalition forces used such jammers 
successfully during the recent Middle East conflicts, but they also discovered that the 
jammers indiscriminately disrupted the use of RF devices for friendly forces such as 
communications systems (Kempinski and Murphy 2012). Besides indiscriminate 
jamming, another disadvantage of jammers is that they can only jam IEDs as long as the 
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jammers are in the immediate vicinity of the IEDs. Once the jammers leave the area, 
insurgents can still remotely detonate the IEDs to attack other friendly targets that do not 
have jammer support. Finally, these jammers are only effective against IEDs that rely on 
RF signals for detonation, and they will not work against other detonation triggers, such 
as tripwires, IR, pressure and contact. 
c. Threat Suppression 
Since it is not always possible for one to detect an IED threat before friendly 
forces enter an operational area, military planners often use area jammers to prevent the 
remote detonation of IEDs that rely on RF for initiation, thus suppressing the IED threat. 
While such jammers are effective, jamming is not a “catch-all” solution for IEDs and 
have their own set of trade-offs. 
Engineers can consider directed energy (DE) systems, such as those using high 
powered microwave (HPM) to address the shortcomings of RF-based IED jammers. 
According to Diehl, HPM works by using electromagnetic energy to induce currents in 
electronic circuits (2013). Most IEDs have some form of electronics in them, such as 
cables, connections and circuit boards, and these components act as antennas to receive 
the EM energy from HPM systems. Since electronic circuits normally operate with 
supply voltages ranging from 1V to 5V, HPM systems are capable of inducing voltages 
much higher than these values within the IEDs (Diehl 2013). This can potentially 
overload and burn the IED’s circuitry and thus, permanently disable the IEDs, unlike the 
temporary disabling of IEDs by a RF jammer (see Figure 37). Therefore, HPM systems 
are more effective in neutralizing a wider spectrum of IEDs than RF jammers. Since 
HPM systems can permanently disable IEDs, one needs fewer numbers of HPM-
equipped vehicles to protect a convoy of friendly forces. This author thinks that 
positioning one or two HPM-equipped vehicles at the front of a friendly convoy is 
sufficient to provide IED protection to the convoy. In contrast, one often needs multiple 
RF-jammer equipped vehicles to protect the entire convoy, especially if the convoy is 
large. Since RF jamming is only temporary, one needs to distribute multiple jammer 
 93 
vehicles throughout the convoy to ensure that there are no coverage gaps in the jamming. 
Figure 38 shows a HPM-equipped vehicle. 
 
Figure 37.  Key Difference Between Jammers and HPM. Source: Diehl (2013). 
 
Figure 38.  HPM System Mounted at the Front of a GCV. Source: Diehl (2013). 
This chapter identified and analyzed the key threats that GCVs face in an urban 
environment, which include rockets, missiles, KE penetrators and IEDs. This section then 
proposed and discussed appropriate susceptibility reduction techniques and technologies 
that one can use to counter the threats. In the subsequent chapters, this thesis will use the 
susceptibility reduction techniques and technologies to develop survivability architectures 
to fulfill the various survivability characteristics (determined using modeling and 
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simulation) that a GCV needs to have to meet defined threat scenarios and survivability 
requirements. 
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VIII. PROPOSED METHODOLOGY TO PERFORM SYSTEM-
LEVEL ASSESSMENT FOR A GCV 
Many factors affect the overall survivability of a ground combat vehicle. The 
traditional survivability approach for ground vehicles focuses primarily on the two inner 
most layers of the survivability onion (vulnerability reduction). Based on this author’s 
experience, most survivability models are not available over open-sources due to the 
sensitive nature of survivability. Known survivability assessment tools today such as the 
Modular UNIX-based Vulnerability Estimation Suite (MUVES) and the BRL-CAD, 
focus primarily on vulnerability reduction. This author was unable to find any detailed 
information on MUVES and BRL-CAD from open sources, but available descriptions of 
the tools indicate that they focus primarily on ballistic vulnerability and not 
susceptibility. This focus on vulnerability is not surprising because of the conventional 
approach to ground combat vehicle survivability, which focuses on vulnerability 
reduction. Due to the advent of asymmetric and urban warfare, vulnerability reduction is 
no longer sufficient for ground vehicles, and military planners and engineers need to 
leverage susceptibility reduction to increase the probability that a ground vehicle survives 
in an asymmetric and urban operational environment. With many more factors to 
consider in the overall survivability design of a ground vehicle, there must be a way for 
one to quantify the different factors and to view their interactions in determining the 
overall survivability of the vehicle. This means that for a certain survivability 
requirement, one can likely find different possible combination of factors to meet the 
requirement. Hence, the first section of this chapter proposes a model to perform 
survivability assessment, taking into account both susceptibility and vulnerability 
reduction.  
The second section of this chapter addresses the natural capability conflicts that 
arise between survivability and other key GCV capabilities. This section then 
demonstrates how one can use decision-making methodologies to manage the conflicts 
and trade-offs to help decision-makers determine the most cost-effective set of 
survivability characteristics to meet a defined survivability requirement. This author 
 96 
hopes that the model and the decision-making methodology presented in this chapter 
helps military planners and engineers design more robust and holistic survivability 
solutions for ground combat vehicles, to deal with a wider spectrum of threats and threat 
scenarios. 
Survivability is a highly sensitive topic, with minimal information available via 
open-sources. Therefore, this author made certain assumptions to derive the data used in 
the model and simulations. This author wishes to emphasize that the data used does not 
represent the characteristics of any particular ground vehicle in use today. 
A. SIMULATING SURVIVABILITY 
1. Probability Tree Diagram 
An often used procedure for estimating a vehicle’s survivability is a probability 
tree diagram, such as the one-on-one probability tree diagram shown in Figure 39, where 
a pair of branches represents the outcome of each phase of the scenario. Christopher 
Adams, a lecturer at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, presented the probability 
tree diagram in his lecture on combat survivability. According to Ball, the main purpose 
of a probability tree diagram is to highlight the different phases of an engagement 
scenario and to depict the possible outcomes for each of the phases, as well as the 
corresponding probabilities for each of the outcomes (2003). Ball also explains that one 
can use the probability tree diagram to illustrate improvements in the survivability of a 
ground vehicle through the use of various survivability enhancement features, such as 
adding a hard-kill APS or incorporating signature reduction features (2003). Figure 39 
shows that the one-on-one probability tree progresses in a top-down manner. Each phase 
of the engagement scenario has two mutually exclusive outcomes, and a numbered node 
represents the start of a phase (from 0 to 4). The next node at the end of an arrow 
represents the end of a phase. On the left side of each node, one can see a description for 
that particular phase of the engagement scenario. For example, the first phase (search 
phase), lies between nodes (0) and (1) of the tree diagram, and one can find a description 
of that phase to the left of the node (exposure avoidance). 
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Figure 39.  Tree Diagram for the One-on-One Scenario. Source: Adams (2016). 
According to Ball (2003), a ground vehicle will be “hit only when each of the first 
four susceptibility phases has a successful outcome. The likelihood or probability that 
each susceptibility phase will have a successful outcome at some time during the 
scenario, given that the preceding phases were successful, can be estimated with a 
conditional probability.” (12) Ball uses probabilities to measure the likelihood of success 
for each of the four susceptibility phases: 
1. PA is the probability that a hostile weapon system is in the vicinity of the 
GCV, is actively scanning for ground vehicles and is ready to engage any 
ground vehicles that enter the defended area.  
2. PD|A is the conditional probability that a hostile weapon system detects the 
GCV, given that the hostile weapon system is actively scanning for the 
ground vehicle.  
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3. PL|D is the conditional probability that a hostile weapon system launches a 
projectile or missile to engage the GCV, given that the hostile weapon 
system is active and has detected the ground vehicle. Before the hostile 
weapon system can engage the GCV, it must first obtain the appropriate 
fire control solution. 
4. PH|L is the conditional probability that the projectile or missile hits the 
GCV, given that the hostile weapon system has launched the projectile or 
missile at the ground vehicle (2003). 
Considering all of the possible susceptibility events in Figure 39, one sees that the 
only event that results in a hit of the vehicle is the one that proceeds down the right side 
of the probability tree. All of the other possible events (i.e., the left side of the probability 
tree) result in a vehicle surviving the encounter (the complement events), as the hostile 
threat is unable to hit the vehicle. Consequently, one can refer to all of the right side, 
downwards-pointing arrows, as the kill chain. If one breaks any of the chain links, (i.e., 
proceed along the left side of the probability tree for any of the engagement phases), this 
means that the hostile weapon is unable to achieve success in that particular phase of the 
engagement and therefore, the vehicle survives the encounter. Thus, one can calculate the 
probability that a threat hits the vehicle or P(Hit) in the one-on-one scenario by 
multiplying all four probabilities in the susceptibility phase (i.e., PAPD|APL|DPH|L). One can 
then calculate the probability that a threat kills a ground combat vehicle, which is simply 
the product of P(Hit) and P(Killed given hit). P(Hit) represents the susceptibility of the 
ground vehicle, while P(Killed give hit) represents the vulnerability of the ground 
vehicle. 
2. Model Description 
This thesis uses ExtendSim to develop the model, which leverages the one-on-one 
probability tree diagram. According to Law (2015), ExtendSim is a graphics-based 
simulation, whereby “a model is constructed by selecting blocks from libraries (such as 
Item, Value, Plotter), placing the blocks at appropriate locations in the model window, 
connecting the blocks to indicate the flow of entities (or values) through the system, and 
then detailing the blocks using dialog boxes.” (198) For the purpose of simulation, this 
thesis assumes that the survivability requirement is to ensure no more than 5% 
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probability that a missile attack kills a ground combat vehicle, at 95% confidence level 
(CL). An increasingly common threat scenario in an urban environment is one whereby 
an enemy launches a missile relatively close to the GCV. A one-on-one scenario is 
common in urban engagements because the majority of anti-GCV missiles are either 
semi-active homing or CLOS, which requires an operator to guide the missile to the 
target. Therefore, the operator can only engage one GCV each time. Based on this 
author’s experience, it is also not a common tactic to fire multiple missiles at a single 
GCV at the same time, especially when there are other GCVs for one to engage in the 
immediate area. While rockets are still predominantly the main threats to ground vehicles 
in an urban environment, advanced missiles are increasingly prevalent in recent conflicts. 
In the ongoing Syrian conflict for example, Stratfor reported that insurgents possess large 
quantities of advanced ATGMs from Russia, Europe, and the United States, and the 
insurgents are using them to deadly effect (Stratfor 2015). Since ATGMs typically have 
arming distances of around 50m, this thesis uses an engagement distance of 100m in the 
model, which is reasonable due to the constrained nature of an urban environment. This 
thesis also uses the key parameters shown in Table 9, which are derived from the 











Table 9.   Key Parameters Used in the Model. 
Parameters Description 
Probability of Active This represents the probability that a hostile threat is present 
in the area of operations and is actively seeking out the 
ground combat vehicle. 
Probability of Detection Given that there is an active hostile threat actively seeking 
out the ground vehicle, this parameter represents the 
likelihood that the hostile threat detects the ground vehicle. 
Probability of Launch (or 
Engage) 
Given that hostile threat has detected the ground vehicle, 
this parameter represents the likelihood that the hostile 
threat is able to obtain a firing solution to launch a missile at 
the ground vehicle. 
Probability of Hit Given that the hostile threat has launched a missile, this 
parameter represents the probability that the missile can be 
successfully guided to hit the ground vehicle. 
Probability of Kill Given that the missile hits the ground vehicle, this 
parameter represents the probability that the ground vehicle 
is killed.  
 





Figure 40.  Basic ExtendSim Model. 
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1. Create block. This block creates a single missile threat to the vehicle. The 
block represents the start point of the simulation, which proceeds from left 
to right 
2. Read block. This block reads the various probabilities (described in Table 
9) from the input database into the model.  
3. RAND block. This block generates random numbers from 0 to 1 using a 
uniform distribution, which is fed into the equation block. This block 
creates uncertainty in the survivability simulation. 
4. Equation block. Using an IF statement, the equation block compares the 
generated random number with the appropriate probability from the 
database. If the random number is less than or equal to the corresponding 
probability, the equation block generates an output of “1,” which means 
that the threat has detected, engaged, hit or killed the GCV. If not, the 
equation block returns a “0,” which means that the vehicle survived the 
engagement, as the threat was unable to detect, engage, hit or kill the 
vehicle. For example, Figure 41 shows the equation block for detection. 
As one can see, the randomly generated number (0.745) is smaller than the 
detection probability of 0.8, thus the equation block returns a “1,” meaning 
that the threat has detected the vehicle.  
5. Select block. Depending on the output from the equation block (“1” or 
“0”), the select block determines the next course of action for the 
simulation. Using detection as an example, if the threat is unable to detect 
the vehicle (returns a “0”), the vehicle survives and the select block routes 
the simulation to the “Survive” exit block. If the threat detects the vehicle 
(returns a “1”), then the select block routes the simulation to the next 
phase, which determines whether the threat can engage the vehicle. 
6. Write block. This block captures the outcome of each simulation and 
writes it into the output database. One can analyze the output database to 
determine the overall probability of survival for the ground vehicle and to 
perform statistical analysis such as regression analysis. 
 103 
 
Figure 41.  Equation Block Used to Determine if GCV Was Detected. 
3. Model Verification 
Before one uses the model to perform detailed survivability assessment, it is 
important for one to verify that the model is correctly set up. This thesis does this by 
comparing the simulation results to the back-of-envelope (BOE) results using the 
probability tree diagram. Table 10 shows the values of the key parameters that this author 
used for the simulation and the BOE calculation. This author ran the simulation five 
times, and Table 11 compares the simulation results with the BOE results. One can see 
that both sets of results are similar, meaning that this author set up the model correctly. 





Table 10.   Values Used for Model Verification. 
Probability of Active 1.0 
Probability of Detection 0.8 
Probability of Launch 0.7 
Probability of Hit 0.8 
Probability of Kill 0.6 
Table 11.   Comparison of Simulated Results and BOE Results. 
 Simulation BOE 
Run 
Number 
P(Survive) P(Killed) P(Survive) P(Killed) 
1 74.8% 25.2% 73.1% 26.9% 
2 74.8% 25.2% 
3 73.6% 26.4% 
4 71.6% 28.4% 
5 72.8% 27.2% 
 
4. Using Model to Perform Survivability Assessment 
As military planners and engineers move toward incorporating susceptibility 
reduction into the ground vehicle survivability concept, one can use the ExtendSim 
model to determine the appropriate sets of survivability characteristics (represented by 
the various probabilities in this case) that a ground combat vehicle needs to have in order 
to fulfill the survivability requirement for the given threat scenario. Previously, due to the 
focus on vulnerability reduction, military planners and engineers are typically only 
concerned with the probability that a missile kills a ground vehicle, given that the missile 
hits the ground vehicle. 
a. Incorporating Hard-Kill APS into the Model 
Hard-kill APS is a key upcoming susceptibility reduction technology that uses 
physical countermeasures to intercept incoming threats to prevent them from hitting the 
protected ground vehicle. Therefore, this author proposes to include hard-kill APS into 
the survivability assessment. Figure 42 shows the addition of the hard-kill APS branch 
into the ExtendSim model, which is in between the vehicle engagement phase and the 
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vehicle-hit phase. The addition of the APS branch introduces two new parameters, 
namely minimum defeat distance (MDD) and APSP(hit), into the model. This brings the 
total number of parameters that one can use in the survivability assessment to seven. For 
a detailed discussion on hard-kill APS, please refer to Chapter VII. 
1. Minimum defeat distance (MDD) is a key performance parameter for a 
hard-APS. MDD represents the dead-zone of an APS-equipped ground 
vehicle. This means that if an enemy fires a rocket or missile within the 
dead-zone, the hard-kill APS is unable to react fast enough to the threat. In 
the revised ExtendSim model, if the incoming threat is within the APS’s 
MDD (meaning APS is unable to engage the threat), the select block 
routes the simulation to the branch that determines whether the threat can 
hit and kill the vehicle. If the threat is outside the APS’s MDD (meaning 
the APS is able to engage the threat), the select block routes the simulation 
to the branch that determines if the APS can destroy the threat (based on 
the APSP(hit)). If the APS manages to destroy the threat, the simulation 
ends with the vehicle survival. If not, the select block routes the simulation 
to the branch that determines whether the threat can hit and kill the 
vehicle. 
2. APSP(hit) refers to the probability that the hard-kill APS is able to detect, 
classify, intercept and defeat an incoming threat. Therefore, APSP(hit) is 




Figure 42.  Addition of APS Branch to the ExtendSim Model 
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b. Nearly Orthogonal Latin Hypercubes (NOLH) Design 
The parameters or factors in Table 10 represent the survivability characteristics of 
a ground combat vehicle, whose values and interactions affect overall system 
survivability. One can use different experimental designs to explore the design space for 
the parameters, to determine possible combinations of parameters that can meet a 
survivability requirement. According to Sanchez (2006), factorial designs of the form mk, 
where m refers to the number of levels and k refers to the number of factors, are popular 
experimental designs because they are relatively easy to construct and explain. While 
factorial designs have good space-filling properties (especially with larger m), which 
facilitates a detailed study of how the various factors affect system performance, Sanchez 
claims that factorial designs are in fact “not good experimental designs for more than a 
handful of factors because of their massive data requirements.” (52) Figure 43 illustrates 
how data requirements for factorial designs change exponentially as m and k change, 
which supports Sanchez’s claim. 
 
Figure 43.  Data Requirements for Factorial Designs. Source: Sanchez (2006). 
In order to mitigate the issue of large data requirements, Sanchez (2006) proposes 
the Latin hypercubes (LH) methodology as an alternative to the factorial design. 
According to Sanchez, “LH sampling provides a flexible way of constructing efficient 
designs for quantitative factors. They have some of the space-filling properties of 
factorial designs with fine grids, but require orders of magnitude less sampling.” (52) For 
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example, a two-factor, 11-level factorial design generates 121 design points (112). If one 
uses LH design, one only requires 11 design points to perform an adequate assessment on 
the effects that the factors have on system performance (Sanchez 2006). It is evident that 
LH sampling is useful as the number of factors (k) increases. For small to moderate 
number of factors however, Cioppa and Lucas proposes the nearly orthogonal Latin 
hypercubes (NOLH) methodology (Sanchez 2006). The NOLH methodology generates 
different number of design points depending on the value of k. Figure 44 shows the 
number of design points for 𝑘𝑘 ≤ 29.  
 
Figure 44.  Data Requirements for Nearly Orthogonal Latin Hypercube Designs. 
Source: Sanchez (2006). 
Based on the seven factors in the revised ExtendSim model and the criteria in 
Figure 44, 17 design points are sufficient for the analysis. Nevertheless, this author 
decided to use 33 design points instead (for 8 to 11 factors) because orthogonality of the 
NOLH design improves as the number of design points increases (Tng 2014). Another 
key reason is the small range between the low and high values for most of the factors, 
which means that increasing the number of design points improves the resolution of the 
analysis. In order to generate the design points, one needs to first define the low and high 
values for each parameter or factor. This thesis uses the low and high values seen in 
Table 12 to generate the design points. One should note that the survivability 
characteristics of any military platform is highly sensitive information and not available 
via open sources. Thus, this author chose the values in Table 12 based on certain 
assumptions, and the values do not represent any particular system in use today.  
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1. P(active) refers to the probability that a hostile sensor is actively looking 
for ground vehicles. An urban environment provides multiple concealed 
surveillance sites for hostile forces and therefore, it is reasonable to 
assume that hostile forces are constantly monitoring and looking for 
ground vehicles in an urban environment (i.e., P(active)=1)). Since 
P(active) is equal to one, there was no need to include P(active) inside the 
design factors and ExtendSim model. As such, the model only needs to 
consider six factors instead of seven. 
2. It is easy for a hostile force to detect ground combat vehicles in an urban 
environment due to their large size and the many signatures that a ground 
vehicle emits, primarily acoustic, vibration and thermal signatures. Thus, 
this thesis chose a large lower bound value of 0.7. 
3. For probability of engage and probability of hit, this thesis chose smaller 
low bound values. This is because there are many techniques and 
technologies that one can use to minimize these two probabilities. For 
example, if a sensor warns a ground vehicle of hostile “lasing” actions, the 
vehicle can attempt to suppress the enemy who is performing the lasing, 
and this minimizes the probability that the enemy can launch a laser 
guided missile at the vehicle. Similarly, for probability of hit, one can use 
smoke, aerosols and jammers to minimize the probability that an enemy 
can successfully guide the missile to hit the vehicle. 
4. For probability of kill, this thesis chose a relatively large lower bound 
value of 0.6. This is because an urban environment allows enemies to 
attack ground vehicles at their weakest spots, such as the sides, the rear or 
the roof. Since military planners and engineers design existing ground 
vehicles to survive head-on engagements over relatively open terrain, the 
vehicles have the heaviest armor at the front. On the other hand, military 
planners and engineers usually protect the vehicle’s side, top and rear 
against lighter rockets and small and medium caliber projectiles only. 
Thus, a ground vehicle is largely vulnerable to missile attacks, especially 
in urban environment.  
5. According to Dieter and Wagner (2009), the MDD for hard-kill APS 
against anti-armor missiles can range from as low as 10m to greater than 
100m. Thus, this thesis chose 10m and 200m for the low and high values 
respectively. 
6. This thesis chose an average value of 0.5 as the lower bound for 
APSP(hit), as it is unlikely for engineers to deliberately design a low 
performance APS. For the upper bound, it is not realistic in this author’s 
opinion to expect the hard-kill APS to perform perfectly all the time. Thus, 
an upper bound of 0.9 was chosen. According to Thompson (2012), the 
success rate for the Israeli IRON DOME system, which uses physical 
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interceptors to shoot down rockets, mortars and artillery shells, has a 
success rate of about 90%. 
Table 12.   Low and High Values for Design Factors. 
Design Factor Low Value High Value 
Probability of Detection 0.7 1 
Probability of Launch (or 
engage) 
0.3 1 
Probability of Hit 0.3 1 
Probability of Kill 0.6 1 
MDD 10 200 
APSP(hit) 0.5 0.9 
 
Based on the low and high levels, this author generated 33 design points using the 
NOLH spreadsheet that one can download from the website of the Seed Center for Data 
Farming, Naval Postgraduate School (see Figure 45). The “decimal” row in the 
spreadsheet controls the number of decimal places for each design point. This author used 
two decimal places for the probabilities as there was only a small range between the low 
and high values. On the other hand, this author did not use decimal places for MDD as 
the range between the low and high values was large. 
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Figure 45.  Generated NOLH Design Points for Simulation. 
Before using the generated design points for survivability analysis, this author 
verified that the design points have sufficient orthogonality and good space-filling 
properties. According to Tng (2014), orthogonality “means that the design points are 
independent, and the results of one design point will not be dependent on the other design 
points.” (54) Tng (2014) determines the degree of orthogonality by the level of 
correlation between two factors, and the closer the pairwise correlation value is to zero, 
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the better the degree of orthogonality. While it is usually not possible to have zero 
pairwise correlation values between factors, Tng mentions that based on his discussion 
with Professor Thomas W. Lucas (Naval Postgraduate School), correlation values less 
than +/- 0.05 are sufficient to demonstrate independence between the design points 
(2014). This thesis generated a correlation matrix for the six factors using the correlation 
function in the analysis toolpack of Microsoft Excel, with the results shown in Figure 46. 
The correlation matrix shows that the pairwise correlation values between the six factors 
all fall within the +/- 0.05 guideline, which means that there is sufficient independence 
and orthogonality between the factors. One can assess the space-filling properties of the 
design points by looking at the scatterplot matrix of the design points. Using the JMP Pro 
12 software, this thesis generated the scatterplot matrix for the design points (see Figure 
47). One can see from the scatterplot matrix that there is no abnormally large empty 
space for any of the factors and therefore, one can conclude that the generated design 
points have good space-filling properties. Since this thesis has verified that the design 
points have sufficient orthogonality and good space-filling properties, the next step is to 
use the 33 generated design points for survivability analysis. 
 
Figure 46.  Correlation Matrix for the Design Factors. 
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Figure 47.  Scatterplot Matrix for the Design Factors. 
5. Simulation Results 
This thesis simulated each of the 33 generated design points 200 times in 
ExtendSim to determine if they meet the 95% survivability requirement. Figure 48 shows 
the outcome of the simulations, and one can see that only five out of the 33 design points 
meet the 95% survivability requirement (namely design points #21, 25, 28, 32 and 33). 
This thesis then calculated a 95% upper bound CI for each of the five design points to 
ensure that they meet the 95% survivability requirement (see Table 13). This author 
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chose an upper bound CI because the survivability requirement is that the probability of a 
missile killing the ground vehicle cannot exceed 5%.  
 
Figure 48.  Simulation Outcomes for the 33 Design Points. 
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Table 13.   95% Upper Bound CI for Design Points That Meet Requirement. 
Design Point 
# 
95% Upper Bound CI for the Probability of Being Killed by a Missile 
21 Mean: 0.013 (1.3%) 
Upper bound: 0.0161 (1.61%) 
25 Mean: 0.0253 (2.53%) 
Upper bound: 0.0293 (2.93%) 
28 Mean: 0.0143 (1.43%) 
Upper bound: 0.0183 (1.83%) 
32 Mean: 0.00967 (0.967%) 
Upper bound: 0.0119 (1.19%) 
33 Mean: 0.04 (4%) 
Upper bound: 0.0463 (4.63%) 
 
6. Regression Analysis and Model Fitting 
Based on the simulation results for all 33 design points, this thesis then performed 
regression analysis to determine a best-fit linear expression that predicts how the overall 
probability of survival changes with the six different factors. Using the Fit Model 
function in JMP Pro 12, this thesis generated an Actual by Predicted Plot (see Figure 49), 
which shows how well the predicted linear model fits the simulated data. The solid line in 
Figure 49 represents the predicted linear model, while the two dotted lines on top and 
beneath the solid line represents the upper and lower boundaries of the model 
respectively. The dots represent the individual simulated data and the more dots that fall 
within the lower and upper bounds, the better the fit of the predicted linear model. One 
can see that majority of the data points fit within the two boundaries. Figure 49 also 
shows the R2 value of the fit, which has a relatively large value of 0.809. This means that 
the predicted linear model is able to account for 80.9% of the variation in the overall 
probability that a missile attack kills the ground combat vehicle. Finally, Figure 49 also 
shows the analysis of variance (ANOVA) results for the regression analysis. One can see 
that the p-value from ANOVA is extremely small (less than 0.0001). A small p-value 
means that one can reject the null hypothesis, which states that none of the six factors has 
any significant impact on the overall probability that a missile attack kills the ground 
combat vehicle. In other words, this means that there is at least one factor that has a 
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significant impact on the overall probability that a missile attack kills the ground combat 
vehicle. 
 
Figure 49.  Actual by Predicted Plot and Regression Analysis Results. 
The regression analysis functionality in JMP Pro 12 can rank the factors 
according to the amount of effect each factor has on the overall probability that a missile 
attack kills the ground combat vehicle. This is shown in Figure 50. One can see that 
MDD of the hard-kill APS has the greatest effect on the ground combat vehicle’s overall 
probability of survival. This author expected this as a hard-kill APS seeks to destroy an 
incoming threat before the threat hits the protected vehicle, and MDD determines 
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whether the hard-kill APS is able to react fast enough to an incoming threat. This means 
that the shorter the MDD, the more suitable is the hard-kill APS for urban operations, due 
to the typically short engagement distances in urban operations. P(detect) has a p-value of 
0.0518, which is slightly higher than the chosen significance level of 0.05. Strictly 
speaking, this means that the p-value lies in the rejection region, and there is not enough 
statistical evidence to reject the null hypothesis that P(detect) has no significant effect on 
the overall probability of survival. Nevertheless, this author chose to retain P(detect) as a 
significant factor as the p-value is very close to the 0.05 threshold. Figure 50 also shows 
the predicted coefficients for each of the factors in the best-fit linear model. With the 
exception of APSP(hit), all the coefficients are positive. This means that the larger the 
values of those factors, the higher the probability that a missile can kill the ground 
combat vehicle. Conversely, for APSP(hit), the higher the value, the lower the probability 
that a missile can kill the ground combat vehicle. This makes sense because a higher 
APSP(hit) means a higher probability that the APS can successfully intercept an 
incoming missile. 
 
Figure 50.  Ranking of Factors According to Their Effect on Overall P(Killed). 
One can potentially fulfil each of the five design points by combining different 
susceptibility reduction techniques and technologies (discussed in detail under Chapter 
VII). This thesis treats each combination of susceptibility reduction techniques and 
technologies as a survivability architecture. Therefore, each survivability architecture can 
result in differing trade-offs with other important ground combat vehicle capabilities. The 
subsequent sections of this chapter discuss about capability trade-offs and demonstrate 
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how one can use decision-making methodologies to manage the capability conflicts and 
trade-offs to determine the most cost-effective survivability architecture. 
B. CONFLICT BETWEEN SURVIVABILITY AND OTHER KEY GCV 
CAPABILITIES 
This thesis mentioned previously that survivability is only one of the three 
essential capabilities of a ground combat vehicle, with the other two essential capabilities 
being mobility and lethality. Table 1 in Chapter III presented important capabilities for 
any ground combat vehicle, which one can trace back to the three essential capabilities of 
survivability, mobility and lethality. While the capabilities in Table 1 are important, it is 
not technically possible or economically feasible for engineers to achieve all of them in 
the design of a ground combat vehicle, due to the natural conflict that exists between the 
capabilities. For example, consider the conflict between the “carry a large and/or heavy 
payload over a long distance” capability and the “easy deployment and transport” 
capability. In order to fulfil the former, engineers need to increase the size of a ground 
vehicle to accommodate the payload and the additional fuel that the vehicle requires for 
long distance movement. If there is a need to protect the payload (e.g., soldiers in the case 
of IFVs, ICVs and APCs), engineers need to incorporate additional armor into the ground 
vehicles, which results in further weight increase to the vehicles. The significantly larger 
and heavier ground vehicle may then be unable to fulfil the capability of “easy 
deployment and transport,” as it can be difficult to fit the vehicle inside a cargo transport 
plane, especially smaller planes such as the C-130 Hercules. The size and weight increase 
of the ground vehicle also adversely affects the “fuel efficient” capability. Therefore, this 
author regards the design of ground combat vehicles as a zero sum game between the 
three main high-level attributes of mobility, lethality and survivability.  
According to Bochenek (2007), the U.S. Army uses a simple, three degree of 
freedom trade-space construct known as “The Iron Triangle” to address the dilemma 
between mobility, lethality and survivability. The U.S. Army classifies ground vehicle 
capabilities into one of the three primary categories of Payload, Performance and 
Protection, and each side of the Iron Triangle represents one of these three primary 
capability categories, as shown in Figure 51. Therefore, the main purpose of the Iron 
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Triangle is to illustrate the conflicts between the three capabilities categories of Payload, 
Performance and Protection and to emphasize the importance of a proper balance 
between them. Therefore, military planners and engineers need to be aware of the various 
trade-offs when designing a ground vehicle and strive to achieve a proper balance 
between all of the capabilities. 
 
Figure 51.  The Iron Triangle Construct Used by the U.S. Army. Source: 
Bochenek (2007). 
C. USING MULTI-ATTRIBUTE DECISION MAKING TO MANAGE 
CONFLICT BETWEEN SURVIVABILITY AND OTHER KEY 
CAPABILITIES 
The key to a successful ground combat vehicle design is in achieving proper 
balance between the different conflicting capabilities. While the ExtendSim modeling 
allows one to determine potential survivability characteristics for a ground combat 
vehicle to meet a survivability requirement, the model does not account for the resultant 
trade-offs with other key capabilities. Thus, when one performs system-level assessment 
of a ground combat vehicle, it is important to have a methodology to identify the various 
trade-offs and to present them in an appropriate manner to the key stakeholders for 
decision making. In the SE process, there are many methods that one can use for trade-off 
analysis and decision making. Such methods include “ranking, elimination, weighting 
and rating.” (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011, 187) Since there are multiple, conflicting 
factors in the overall design of a ground combat vehicle, one can use a well-established 
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SE methodology known as multi-attribute decision-making (MADM) to facilitate the 
decision making process. Gregory Miller, a lecturer at the Naval Postgraduate School in 
Monterey, presented a typical MADM decision table during his lecture on Systems 
Architecting and Design (see Figure 52). One can see that there are five main 
components to the decision table for MADM: 
1. The left-hand column of the table shows the architecturally different 
alternatives that can fulfill the system requirements. 
2. Attributes are the key factors that one uses to assess the overall system 
performance.  
3. Each attribute has a weight reflecting the relative importance or priority of 
that attribute in the overall system-level assessment. 
4. Each alternative has performance value scores for every attribute, which 
reflects how well the alternative performs for that attribute 
5. The final score for each alternative is a weighted sum-product between the 
attribute weightages and the performance values achieved for each 
alternative. 
 
Figure 52.  Typical Decision Table Used in MADM. Source: Miller (2016). 
1. Key Attributes 
Based on this author’s experience, Table 14 shows key attributes that stakeholders 
are typically concerned with during the design of a new ground combat vehicle, which 
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are also similar to the capabilities that this thesis presented in Table 1 of Chapter III. The 
attributes in Table 14 are for illustration purpose only and one needs to determine the 
actual attributes with the key stakeholders as early as possible in the program. One can 
see that while survivability is a key attribute for the GCV, military planners and 
engineers need to balance survivability at a system level with other key attributes as well. 
For example, engineers can improve survivability by adding heavier armor to the GCV, 
but this degrades other factors such as passenger payload and fuel efficiency, which has 
adverse repercussions for the ability of the GCV to complete its mission. Engineers can 
also improve survivability by using active signature management, jamming or hard-kill 
APS, but this degrades other attributes such as TRL and power requirement. 
Table 14.   Key Attributes Used for System-Level Assessment of the GCV. 
Attributes Rationale 
Passenger payload A larger payload means that more soldiers can be 
transported into the operational area. 
Combat weight Lower combat weight improves mobility and 
transportability of the ground vehicle. 
Fuel efficiency High fuel efficiency reduces logistics burden. 
Survivability Affects overall mission cost-effectiveness of a system 
Technology readiness level 
(TRL) 
This is a measure of when the system can be matured 
and deployed operationally in the field. 
Power requirement Lower power requirement will reduce electrical loading 
and can free up more space for other components, 
particularly for future upgrades. 
Mean time between failure 
(MTBF) 
Higher MTBF means greater operational availability of 
the ground vehicle and also reduces logistics burden, 
particularly in maintenance and spare parts. 
Quantity of ammunition More ammunition means that the ground vehicle is able 
to engage and destroy more targets, which increases the 
firepower and lethality of the vehicle. 
Vehicle dead-zone The vehicle dead-zone represents the area around the 
vehicle, within which the vehicle has no time to react to 
a threat. For the purpose of this analysis, the vehicle 
dead-zone is measured by MDD.  
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2. Architectural Alternatives 
The ExtendSim simulation determined five design points or design permutations 
that can meet the 95% survivability requirement. Using the susceptibility reduction 
technologies that this thesis discussed previously, one can derive different survivability 
architectures to fulfil the survivability characteristics of the five design points. Table 15 
shows an example of the different survivability architectures that one can derive from the 
various susceptibility reduction technologies.  
Table 15.   Potential Survivability Architectures for the Design Points. 
Design Points Survivability Architectural Description 
21 and 25  - electric or hybrid-electric engines  
- active signature reduction and stealth technology 
- heavy armor (reduced mobility and agility) 
- standard smoke and aerosol 
- hard-kill APS 
- situational awareness system 
- threat warning system coupled to threat suppression 
system 
28/32  - diesel engine  
- mobile camouflage net 
- active jamming only 
- lightweight armor with good agility 
- hard-kill APS 
- situational awareness system 
- threat warning system 
33  - gas turbine engine  
- active jamming in addition to smoke and aerosols 
- medium weight armor with average agility 
- hard-kill APS 
- threat warning system 
 
The different survivability architectures in Table 15 will affect other ground 
combat vehicle capabilities in varying ways. One can quantify these capabilities trade-
offs by using the key attributes in Table 14, which then allows one to perform 
quantitative comparison between the different architectural alternatives (see Table 16). 
Using design points 21 and 28 as an example, one can see that design point 21 has a 
significantly greater weight compared to design point 28, which is due to the heavier 
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armor. This can mean that design point 21 has better survivability, but at the expense of 
lower passenger payload due to overall weight constraints, as well as lower mean time 
between failure (MTBF) due to the heavier wear and tear on components. Similar to 
ExtendSim simulation presented earlier, one should note that the numbers used in Table 
16 are for illustration purpose only, and the numbers are not intended to represent any 
particular ground combat vehicle in use today. This author then normalized the 
performance figures in Table 16, with the highest performing alternative given a value of 
one (see Table 17). This facilitates the MADM assessment subsequently.  
Table 16.   Raw Performance Figures for Each Alternative. 
Design Points 21 25 28 32 33 
Factors Objective      
Passenger 
payload (kg) 
Max 600 850 1500 1200 1000 
Weight 
(tons) 








Min 0.0161 0.0293 0.0183 0.0119 0.0463 
TRL Max 3 3 7 7 8 
MTBF Max 200 250 400 450 350 
Power (kW) Min 20 18 15 11 10 
Ammunition 
capacity 










Table 17.   Normalized Performance Figures for Each Alternative. 
Design Points 21 25 28 32 33 
Factors Objective      
Passenger 
payload (kg) 
Max 0.4 0.567 1 0.8 0.667 




Max 0.5 0.333 1 0.833 0.667 
Probability of 
being killed 
Min 0.739 0.406 0.65 1 0.257 
TRL Max 0.375 0.375 0.875 0.875 1 
MTBF Max 0.444 0.556 0.889 1 0.778 
Power (kW) Min 0.5 0.556 0.883 0.909 1 
Ammunition 
capacity 
Max 0.5 0.625 1 0.875 0.75 
Vehicle dead-
zone (m) 
Min 0.495 0.464 0.73 0.568 1 
 
3. Swing Weight Matrix and Values 
After one has identified and quantified the key attributes, one needs to assign 
weightages to the attributes. Engineers can use different methods to assign weightages to 
attributes, and for this thesis, this author used the swing weight matrix method that 
Parnell and Trainor proposed during the INCOSE International Symposium held in 
Singapore in 2009. Parnell and Trainor (2009) provided the following description of the 
Swing Weight Matrix in their paper: 
The key concept of the swing weight matrix is to define what we mean in 
the decision context by the importance and range of variation for the value 
measures. The idea of the swing weight matrix is straightforward. A 
measure that is very important to the decision should be weighted higher 
than a measure that is less important. A measure that differentiates 
between alternatives, that is, a measure in which value measure ranges 
vary significantly, is weighted more than a measure that does not 
differentiate between alternatives. The first step is to create a matrix in 
which the top defines the value measure importance and the left side 
represents the range of value measure variation. The levels of importance 
and variation should be thought of as constructed scales that have 
sufficient clarity to allow the stakeholders to uniquely place every value 
measure in one of the cells. A measure that is very important to the 
decision and has a large variation in its scale would go in the upper left of 
the matrix (cell labeled A).
 
A value measure that has low importance and 
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has small variation in its scale goes in the lower right of the matrix (cell 
labeled E). (5) 
Consistency Rules. Since many individuals may participate in the 
assessment of weights, it is important to ensure consistency of the weights 
assigned. It is easy to understand that a very important measure with a 
high variation in its range (A) should be weighted more than a very 
important measure with a medium variation in its range (B1). It is harder 
to trade off the weights between a very important measure with a low 
variation in its range (C1) and an important measure with a high variation 
in its range (B2). Weights should descend in magnitude as we move on the 
diagonal from the top left to the bottom right of the swing weight matrix. 
Multiple measures can be placed in the same cell with the same or 
different weights. If we let the letters represent the diagonals in the matrix 
A, B, C, D, and E; A is the highest weighted cell, B is the next highest 
weighted diagonal, then C, then D, and then E. (6) 
Any measure in cell A must be weighted greater than measures in all other 
cells. Any measure in cell B1 must be weighted greater than measures in 
cells C1, C2, D1, D2, and E. Any measure in cell B2 must be weighted 
greater than measures in cells C2, C3, D1, D2, and E. Any measure in cell 
C1 must be weighted greater than measures in cells D1 and E. Any 
measure in cell C2 must be weighted greater than measures in cells D1, 
D2, and E. Any measure in cell C3 must be weighted greater than 
measures in cells D2 and E. Any measure in cell D1 must be weighted 
greater than measures in cell E. Any measure in cell D2 must be weighted 
greater than measures in cell E. No other strict relationships hold. (6) 
Figure 53 shows a sample swing weight matrix. 
 




This author determined the weightages for the attributes in Table 14 by leveraging 
the swing weight matrix methodology. This author first calculated the variation range for 
each set of attribute values and then classified the variations as low, medium or high. One 
can calculate variation range by dividing the difference between the maximum and the 
minimum values by the average value. Using passenger payload as an example, the 
maximum, minimum and average values are 1500, 600 and 1030 respectively, which 
yields a variation range of 0.874. Table 18 shows the variation ranges for all the attributes 
and the classification of the variation ranges. 
Table 18.   Variation for Each Attribute. 
Attributes Variation Classification  
(High, Medium or Low) 
Passenger payload 0.874 High 
Weight 0.4 Low 
Fuel efficiency 1 High 
Probability of being killed 1.41 High 
TRL 0.893 High 
MTBF 0.758 Med 
Power requirement 0.676 Med 
Ammunition capacity 0.667 Med 
Vehicle dead-zone 0.694 Med 
 
Based on the variation range and the importance or priority for each of the 
attributes, this author sorted the attributes into a swing weight matrix. One should note 
that there is subjectivity involved in assigning the importance or priority of the attributes 
and hence, one should always do this in consultation with the key stakeholders to 
minimize the probability of conflicts occurring subsequently. The issue of subjectivity is 
not unique to the swing weight matrix and also occurs in other decision-making 
methodologies such as the analytic hierarchy process (AHP). It is also important for one 
to adhere to the consistency rules when assigning values to the swing weight matrix. 
After completing the swing weight matrix, this author used the formula provided by 
Parnell and Trainor to normalize the swing weights into measure weights. Tables 19 and 





where fi = Un-normalized swing weight for attribute i 
wi = Normalized swing weight or measure weight for attribute i 
Table 19.   Swing Weight Matrix for the Attributes. 
 
Importance of value measure 
Variation in range High Medium Low 
High 
P (being killed) 
(20) 



















    
 







Table 20.   Normalized Measure Weight for Each Attribute. 
Attributes Swing Weight Measure Weight 
Passenger payload 13 0.12 
Weight 8 0.0741 
Fuel efficiency 10 0.0926 
Probability of being killed 20 0.185 
TRL 15 0.139 
MTBF 9 0.0833 
Power requirement 5 0.0463 
Ammunition capacity 17 0.157 
Vehicle dead-zone 11 0.102 
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D. MADM AND COST COMPARISON 
After determining the swing weights, this author then calculated the weighted 
score for each of the architectural alternatives, using the decision matrix in Table 21. The 
normalized measure weights for each attribute are in the top row, below which are the 
normalized performance values for each of the alternatives. This author computed the 
final weighted score for each alternative by taking the sum-product of the measure 
weights and the normalized performance values. One can see from Table 21 that design 
point 28 has the highest benefit score of 0.873 and design point 21 has the lowest benefit 
score of 0.522. This means that from a purely system performance point of view, design 
point 28 is the best overall performer. Nevertheless, one also needs to consider the cost-
effectiveness of the various alternatives before deciding on the alternative to adopt, as the 
best performing alternative may not be the most cost-effective and vice versa.  
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0.12 0.0741 0.0926 0.185 0.139 0.0833 0.0463 0.157 0.102  
Design 
Points 
          
21 0.4 0.667 0.5 0.739 0.375 0.444 0.5 0.5 0.495 0.522 
25 0.567 0.727 0.333 0.406 0.375 0.556 0.556 0.625 0.464 0.498 
28 1 1 1 0.65 0.875 0.889 0.833 1 0.73 0.873 
32 0.8 0.889 0.833 1 0.875 1 0.090 0.875 0.568 0.867 
33 0.667 0.8 0.667 0.257 1 0.778 1 0.75 1 0.719 
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In order to determine which survivability architectural alternative is the most cost 
effective, this author made certain cost assumptions to determine the cost required to 
implement each of the alternatives. Similar to survivability information, the costs to 
implement survivability features are usually not available in open source and thus, the 
assumptions and numbers are for illustration purposes only: 
1. This thesis assumed that a GCV cost about US$10M and survivability-
related features constitute 30% (US$3M of the cost). P(detect), P(engage), 
P(hit) and P(Kill) each constituted US$0.75M to the overall survivability 
cost. 
2. This thesis adjusted the individual survivability costs in proportion to how 
their corresponding probability changes. For example, if P(engage) 
reduced by 20% (an improvement), the additional cost to implement this 
enhancement to P(engage) was US$0.15M (20% of US$0.75M). 
3. For APS, this thesis assumed a baseline model for comparison that cost 
US$1.5M, with MDD of 50m and APSP(hit) of 0.8. This thesis assumed 
that APSP(hit) constituted US$0.75M to the overall APS cost. For 
APSP(hit), this thesis adjusted the cost in proportion to the change in 
APSP(hit). For MDD, this author used the assumptions shown in Table 22. 
For example, for an alternative APS with MDD of 100m and APSP(hit) of 
0.7, this author estimate that it would cost US$1.3M (0.65 + 0.875*0.75) 
to implement, as compared to US$1.5M for the baseline APS system. 
Table 22.   Assumed Relationship Between MDD and Cost. 
MDD Cost to implement (US$M) 
< 25 m 1 
Between 25 m and 75 m 0.75 
Between 75 m and 125 m 0.65 
Between 125 m and 175 m 0.55 
Greater than 175 m 0.45 
 
Based on the cost assumptions, this thesis computed the cost to implement the 
various alternatives and the final benefit-cost ratios (see Table 23). This thesis also 
plotted the cost-efficiency frontier for the alternatives (see Figure 54). Based on the 
benefit-cost ratios and cost-efficiency frontier, one can see that design point 32 is the 
most cost-effective, even though it is neither the cheapest nor does it has the highest-
weighted score (benefit). When plotting the cost efficiency frontier, it is important for 
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one to ensure that both axes start at zero. This prevents distortion of the plotted data 
points, which can lead to incorrect conclusions. 
Table 23.   Benefit-Cost Ratio for the Design Points. 
Design Points Weighted Score 
(Benefit) 
Cost ($M) Benefit-Cost Ratio 
21 0.522 2.12 0.246 
25 0.497 1.96 0.254 
28 0.873 2.14 0.408 
32 0.867 2.06 0.421 
33 0.719 2.05 0.351 
 
 
Figure 54.  Cost-efficiency Frontier for the Different Alternatives. 
The first portion of this chapter developed a working model (using ExtendSim) 
based on the existing one-on-one probability tree diagram, and this author improved the 
model by incorporating hard-kill APS, which is a key upcoming susceptibility reduction 
technology. Based on the defined threat scenario and survivability requirement, this 
author used the NOLH technique to generate 33 design points. This author performed 
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simulation on the design points and determined that only five out of 33 design points can 
meet the survivability requirement. This author then performed regression analysis on the 
simulated data and determined that all six factors are significant to the overall survival 
probability for the ground vehicle, with MDD having the highest level of influence on the 
survival probability. The regression analysis also allowed this author to determine a best-
fit linear model that one can use to predict survivability performance.  
The second portion of this chapter discussed about the natural capability conflicts 
between survivability and other key GCV capabilities. In order to manage the capability 
conflicts, this author demonstrated how one can use a decision-making methodology such 
as MADM to address the capability trade-offs between survivability and other key GCV 
capabilities. This facilitated the subsequent decision-making process to help decision-
makers choose the most cost-effective survivability architecture to fulfill a certain 
survivability requirement.  
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IX. CONCLUSION 
Military planners and engineers designed the majority of GCVs today for the Cold 
War scenario, which assumes head-on combat between near-peer forces, over relatively 
open terrain. The survivability of ground combat vehicles traditionally relies on 
vulnerability reduction through the use of advanced passive armor that engineers optimize 
over the frontal arc of a vehicle. Due to the rapid growth in global urbanization, military 
planners now expect the next generation of ground warfare to be urban in nature, which can 
also involve both symmetric and asymmetric elements. Recent conflicts in the Middle East 
amply demonstrated the survivability shortcomings of existing combat vehicles. While 
passive armor continues to improve in performance and weight efficiency and continues to 
be an important element in the survivability equation, it is no longer possible for military 
planners and engineers to rely solely on vulnerability reduction. This is due to the 
increasing gap between threat lethality and capability of passive armor, the change in threat 
scenario from relatively open terrain to the closed confines of an urban environment and 
the proliferation of advanced anti-armor weapons. Thus, it is important for military 
planners and engineers to consider and incorporate susceptibility reduction techniques and 
technologies upfront in the design of a combat vehicle. 
The thesis identified and analyzed the key threats that ground combat vehicles will 
encounter in urban operations, which include rockets, missiles and smart bombs, kinetic 
energy penetrators and mines and IEDs. Based on the threat analysis, this thesis then 
proposed and discussed appropriate susceptibility reduction techniques and technologies 
that one can use to counter the threats.  
Subsequently, the thesis proposed a survivability assessment model based on the 
one-on-one probability tree diagram, but with the added improvement of incorporating a 
hard-kill APS, which is a key upcoming susceptibility reduction technique. The proposed 
survivability model performs the following functions to facilitate survivability assessment: 
1. Quantify the survivability characteristics of a ground combat vehicle, using 
the factors P(active), P(detect), P(engage), P(hit) and P(kill). Due to the 
incorporation of hard-kill APS, the improved survivability model 
incorporates two additional factors, namely MDD and APSP(hit). 
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2. Generates different sets of survivability characteristics (known as design 
points) using the NOLH methodology. The NOLH methodology is a 
design-of-experiment (DOE) technique for a small number of factors, as is 
the case for this thesis.  
3. Simulates the survivability of the ground combat vehicle using the 
generated sets of design points to determine which sets of design points 
meet the survivability requirement 
Based on the defined threat scenario and assumptions made, five out of 33 design 
points were able to fulfill the survivability requirement. This thesis then performed linear 
regression, which showed that MDD is the most significant factor affecting overall ground 
combat vehicle survivability. The linear regression analysis also allowed this author to 
determine a best-fit linear model that one can use to predict survivability performance.  
Leveraging the earlier discussion on susceptibility reduction techniques and 
technologies, this thesis proposed different survivability architectures to fulfill the five 
design points. Each survivability architecture resulted in trade-offs with other capability 
areas of a ground combat vehicle, due to the natural conflicts between the three essential 
capabilities of a ground combat vehicle, namely survivability, mobility and lethality. In 
order to address the conflicts and to facilitate decision making on the most cost-effective 
survivability architecture, the thesis demonstrated the use of a decision-making 
methodology known as MADM. The MADM methodology used normalized swing 
weights (or measure weights) to determine the overall benefit score (or weighted score) for 
each survivability architecture, based on a set of key attributes that one can use to perform 
system-level assessment of a ground combat vehicle. Finally, this thesis calculated the 
assumed cost for each survivability architecture and determined the most cost-effective 
architecture by plotting a cost-efficiency frontier for all the architectures.  
This author hopes that the improved model and the decision-making methodology 
in this thesis help military planners and engineers design more robust, holistic and balanced 
survivability solutions for ground combat vehicles in the future, to provide more flexibility 
against different types of threats and threat scenarios. 
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